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The forces driving the prescription opioid epidemic currently raging across the 
United States include aggressive marketing, weak regulation, addiction, freely 
prescribing doctors, a glut of pills available for sharing, and easy access to illicit drugs 
like heroin. This thesis aims to quantitatively analyze the interactions between these 
drivers through construction of a System Dynamics model, in order to determine the 
efficacy of policy intervention through Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs. The 
System Dynamics model simulates the flow of doctors’ prescriptions to the two very 
different classes of prescription opioid patients. One class is the long-term pain patients 
whose tolerance and appetite for opioids grows over time, leading them to higher doses, 
often dangerously high, and yet also frequently to feeling under-medicated; the other is 
those patients prescribed opioids for short-term pain, who typically find that they have 
been given more pills than they need. 
These “extra” pills find their way into the hands of friends and family who, in 
common with the patients who received prescriptions, are in jeopardy of addiction to the 
opioids. Those addicted repeatedly visit doctors, shopping for more. Sensitivity analysis 
results reveal that drug diversion is a major contributor to the opioid death rate; that 
mandatory PDMP use will slow but not stop opioid proliferation, and will cause long 
term pain patients to be under-treated in larger numbers; that a significant number of 
people addicted to prescription opioids will transition to heroin use for reasons of price 
and availability; and that the rate of opioid overdose deaths will remain high until and 
unless society is better educated about the risks of addiction. Overall, the study helps 
conclude that the efforts of state governments and the FDA will be insufficient to stem 
the flow of opioids, and that there is no simple intervention to thwart drug diversion and 
sharing of pills. 
  
 






An epidemic of prescription opioid abuse is raging across the United States. The 
news reports daily about the tragic costs in human suffering and death. The purpose of 
this paper is to investigate how this terrible situation arose, and to ask if the policies 
being proposed and enacted have the potential to bring the problem under control. The 
approach taken begins with a thorough review of the literature. From this review I will 
synthesize the most salient issues into a simple model that attempts to capture the 
dynamics of the epidemic. The reality of the problem is very complex, and so the model 
will necessarily be naïve. Yet it is my hope that the model will lead to the identification 
of some recommendations that may prove useful to understanding and remediating the 
epidemic. 
 
Since the year 2000 the rate of opioid prescription overdose deaths in the U.S.A. 
has doubled. More than a hundred thousand people have died. Opioid deaths are the 
second leading cause of accidental death. They are more numerous than deaths from 
falling, fires, choking, or accidental gunshot. Deaths from opioids are second only in 
number to motor vehicle deaths. In 2014 the number of deaths from legal prescription 
opioid overdose was 20,000. This is greater than the number of overdose deaths from the 
illegal drugs cocaine and heroin combined. (https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-
topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates).  
In order to combat the problem, the White House Office of Drug Control 
Management https://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/national-drug-control-strategy 
published and annually updates the prescription drug abuse action plan called “Epidemic: 
Responding to America’s Prescription Drug Abuse Crisis” (2011). This plan calls for 
action regarding opioids through education, monitoring, safe storage & disposal, and 
enforcement. The second of these four strategies – monitoring – is the focus of this thesis. 
Specifically, I focus on the use of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs).  
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Responsibility for monitoring of prescription drugs lies at the level of the states. 
PDMPs are state-run electronic databases used by prescribers, pharmacies and law 
enforcement to track particular prescription medications. State policy makers have 
embraced the use of PDMPs in the last decade. Forty-nine states (all except Missouri) 
have operational PDMPs. The specifics of implementation vary widely from state to 
state. In particular, the use of PDMPs is not mandatory in every state. Many users and 
abusers of opioids have gathered lethal amounts of the drugs legally. They obtain their 
drugs from prescribing doctors by the simple tactic of visiting several doctors. They 
receive multiple prescriptions, and fill them at different pharmacies, to avoid attracting 
unwanted attention. This practice is known as “doctor shopping’ (McDonald & Carlson 
2014). The resultant glut of prescription opioids leads to widespread illicit use. The 
excess drugs are spread through diversion to friends and family, and to drug sellers. 
In this thesis I will assess the efficacy of PDMPs. I will study the role of PDMPs 
in stopping opioid abuse through diversion and doctor shopping. I will compare and 
contrast best practices between the states. I will place a particular emphasis on the impact 
of New York State’s PDMP, which is called I-STOP. An important distinguishing feature 
of I-STOP is that doctors and pharmacists dispensing opioids must use the system. Many 
other states have not made their PDMPs mandatory. Utilization is found to be much 
higher when participation is mandatory, as described in detail later.  
 
Implementation of internet-based PDMPs is still in its infancy. Government 
agencies have been quick to claim success for PDMPs. Yet their analyses are still very 
preliminary, and generally rather superficial. For example, a recent review by Joshua 
Vinciguerra, New York Director of the Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, reports that 
since I-STOP’s inception (1) over 34 million PMP searches on more than 12 million 
patients by over 96,000 searchers have been performed (2) that a comparison of opioid 
prescribing during the year prior to mandated PMP use and the year post implementation 
shows an 8.72% decrease in total prescriptions, (3) that the number of patients with a 
prescription has decreased 10.4%, (4) that in the first year of the mandated use of the 
PDMP the number of “doctor- shoppers” decreased by 75%, and (5) that that trend has 
 
- 4 - 
 
continued with a further drop from the fourth quarter of 2012 to the third quarter of 2015 
to 86%. (http://www.nascsa.org/Conference2015/Presentations/vinciguerra1.pdf) 
 
Closer examination reveals that the definition of “doctor shopper” in this 
presentation is “individuals receiving Rx from 5 or more prescribers & dispensed by 5 or 
more pharmacies”. By this definition the number of doctor shoppers in New York State 
is only a few hundred (Figure 1). Yet the number of prescribers in New York State 
exceeds 100,000, and the number of prescriptions written in New York City alone 
exceeds 2,000,000. Clearly, such a crude algorithm as the Bureau of Narcotic 
Enforcement’s “five prescribers and five pharmacies” only identifies the most egregious 
examples of doctor shopping. Yet this definition will arise repeatedly in other 
publications cited later. 
 
Figure 1 http://www.slideshare.net/OPUNITE/pdmp-5-hopkins-dreyzehneroleary 
 
Despite early claims of success in fighting doctor shopping, opioid deaths and 
illicit opioid use continue to rise. Two major challenges arise in studying this problem. 
Firstly, PDMPs are new (and so there is not much data yet). Secondly, the system of 
opioid migration and use within which PDMPs operate is not well understood.  
 
Nevertheless there is strong evidence of time delays between cause and effect. For 
example, (1) between first writing a patient’s prescription and subsequent opioid 
dependency, and (2) between the increase in prescription rate and the increase in death 
rate; and (3) through accumulations of “stocks & flows” of drugs and their subsequent 
illicit uses. Time delays and stocks & flows are well modeled by System Dynamics (e.g. 
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Sterman 2000). In this thesis I therefore build and employ a system dynamics model of 
opioid use. This approach will reveal the context in which PDMPs operate. It will also 
model the impact of PDMPs on the use and abuse of opioids. 
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2. Literature Review  
 
This literature review is organized in five sections. (1) The History of Opioid Use, 
(2) The Need for Government Intervention and Current Policy Proposals, (3) Prescription 
Drug Monitoring Programs, (4) PDMP Performance Measures, and (5) Support for and 
Continuous Improvement of PDMPs. 
 
2.1 A History of Opioid Use: Opioids have been used as medicine for thousands of 
years. A timeline of opioid use with many sources cited is give at:  
http://www.theatlantic.com/sponsored/purdue-health/a-brief-history-of-opioids/184/ 
The Drug Enforcement Administration Museum recounts that  
The Sumerians referred to opium as Hul Gil, the "joy 
plant" [and] soon passed it on to the Assyrians, who in turn 
passed it on to the Egyptians. As people learned of the 
power of opium, demand for it increased. Many countries 
began to grow and process opium to expand its availability 
and to decrease its cost. Its cultivation spread along the 
Silk Road, from the Mediterranean through Asia and finally 
to China where it was the catalyst for the Opium Wars of 
the mid-1800s. In order to fund their ever-increasing desire 
for Chinese produced tea, Britain, through their control of 
the East India Company, began smuggling Indian opium to 
China. This resulted in a soaring addiction rate among the 
Chinese and led to the Opium Wars of the mid-1800s. 
Subsequent Chinese immigration to work on the railroads 
and the gold rush brought opium smoking to America. 
(https://www.deamuseum.org/ccp/opium/history.html) 
 
Laudanum (tincture of opium in alcohol) was widely used by the Victorians. They 
used it for recreation, for inspiration, for pain relief, and to quiet babies. Morphine was 
derived from opium in the early 19th century. Like laudanum, morphine was named after 
a joyful Latin word, this time the god of dreams. Used widely, it became especially 
prevalent with soldiers during the civil war. After the war, addiction was so widespread 
amongst veterans, that it became known as “soldiers disease”. The US found itself in the 
midst of its first opioid epidemic. Around this time the hypodermic needle was 
developed. The medical community embraced the widespread use of morphine. 
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Because of the addiction concerns associated with morphine, a safer “non-
addictive” alternative was sought. This was the reason why Bayer developed heroin. In 
fact heroin was first marketed as a cough suppressant and non-addictive morphine 
alternative. The name itself is derivative of the word heroine, female hero, or savior.  
 
According to Inciadi & Cicero (2009),  
 
Thomas Dover, a student of British physician Thomas 
Sydenham, is considered the “father” of clinical medicine, 
and a strong advocate of the use of opium for the treatment 
of disease. Dover developed a form of medicinal opium 
known as Dover’s Powder, that contained one ounce each 
of opium, ipecac (the dried roots of a tropical creeping 
plant), and licorice, combined with saltpeter, tartar, and 
wine. Dover’s Powder was introduced in 1709 and soon 
made its way to America, where it remained one of the most 
widely used opium preparations for almost two centuries 
(Inciardi, 2008; Souhami, 2001; Terry & Pellens 1928 ). 
The introduction of Dover’s Powder apparently started a 
trend. By the latter part of the eighteenth century, similar 
patent medicines containing opium were readily available 
throughout urban and rural America. They were sold in 
pharmacies, grocery and general stores, at traveling 
medicine shows, and through the mail (Terry & Pellens, 
1928). This patent medicine industry eventually provided 
the backdrop for the abuse of prescription drugs and other 
pharmaceuticals (Inciardi, 2008). 
 
This was the age of patent medicines -- a medicine sold without a prescription in 
drugstores or by sales representatives, and usually protected by a trademark. At that time 
you could throw what ever you wanted into a bottle -- usually with alcohol, cocaine, 
opioids, and some other euphoric drugs -- and claim it was medicine. Addiction was not 
understood well at all during this time. Some doctors even substituted opioids for alcohol, 
claiming it was a way to treat alcoholism. 
 
The first federal drug law was the opium exclusion act in 1909. This law 
specifically targeted opium smokers, typically Chinese immigrants. It made provision for 
opium derivatives including morphine and laudanum still to be consumed. In December 
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1908 an international commission met in Shanghai to discuss ending the international 
opium trade. This was the first step in creating the modern international drug prohibition 
framework. As with many other instances of prohibition, when opium was outlawed, 
criminals stepped in to meet the demand. Initially the supply dropped considerably, 
driving the price up dramatically. Soon after, criminals were matching and even 
exceeding the previous supply. 
 
In 1914 Congress passed the Harrison Act, which levied taxes on the non-medical 
use of opium, cocaine, marijuana and their derivatives. In 1924 the Heroin Act outlawed 
all use, manufacturing and possession of heroin, even medically. A series of laws 
followed in an attempt to gain control of the drug market, both for tax purposes and in 
order to protect consumers and patients. Finally, in 1938, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act brought cosmetics and medical devices under control. This law required that drugs be 
labeled with adequate directions for safe use. Moreover, it mandated pre-market approval 
of all new drugs. Now a manufacturer would have to prove to the FDA that a drug was 
safe before it could be sold. 
 
A summary of one hundred years of drug control efforts was published by the UN 
on the centennial of the 1909 opium convention in Shanghai. 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/100_Years_of_Drug_Control.pdf 
 
The Durham-Humphrey amendment to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
became effective on April 26 1952 (JAMA. 1952;149(4):371), mandating that  
 
Drugs that cannot be used with relative safety in self-medication 
must bear the legend Caution: Federal law prohibits 
dispensing without prescription on their labels. The 
pharmacist is liable to prosecution if he makes an over-the-
counter sale of any such drug to a customer without obtaining a 
bona fide prescription or oral authorization from a licensed 
practitioner. 
 
The Durham-Humphrey amendment marked the beginning of written 
prescriptions. Now prescriptions were slowly adopted across the states. During the 1970s 
 
- 9 - 
 
the federal scheduling system was implemented. From then on, the federal government 
provided more direction on how prescription drugs should be distributed. 
 
In 1970 President Nixon declared war on drugs. The Controlled Substances Act 
established the current prescription scheduling system in place to this day in the US. This 
was the beginning of the modern problems. Nixon’s Special Message to the Congress on 
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control on June 17, 1971 included these words: 
It is the production of morphine and codeine for medical 
purposes which justifies the maintenance of opium 
production, and it is this production which in turn 
contributes to the world's heroin supply. The development 
of effective substitutes for these derivatives would 
eliminate any valid reason for opium production. While 
modern medicine has developed effective and broadly 
used substitutes for morphine, it has yet to provide a fully 
acceptable substitute for codeine. Therefore, I am 
directing that Federal research efforts in the United States 
be intensified with the aim of developing at the earliest 
possible date synthetic substitutes for all opium 
derivatives. At the same time I am requesting the Director 
General of the World Health Organization to appoint a 
study panel of experts to make periodic technical 
assessments of any synthetics which might replace opiates 
with the aim of effecting substitutions as soon as possible. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3048 
 
The repetitive nature of the drug problem over the last 150+ years is ominously 
clear. In particular, the claims that Purdue Pharma made about Oxycontin in the 1990s 
echo Nixon’s mandate from 1970. They are in turn the same claims used to market heroin 
a century earlier. This repetition of historical patterns must be borne in mind when 
considering modern changes such as the implementation of PDMPs. The repetitive nature 
of the issues makes it easier for us to understand their nature, their likely pitfalls, and the 
ways in which they will likely prove intractable.  
 
2.2 The Need for Government Intervention and Current Policy Proposals: The 
current prescription drug model, and the prohibition of Schedule 1 drugs, was born out of 
a market failure. Before the implementation of any regulation during the last century 
people were free to manufacture, trade, and consume any substances they wanted. As a 
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result many people died or became terribly addicted to substances whose dangers they 
did not understand. Over time the current framework was established in order to address 
this market failure and gain control of the situation. Despite all of the unintended 
consequences associated with the modern drug control framework, we are better off 
today than before drug control began (as demonstrated in the UN Report cited above). 
 
On May 01, 2015 Nora D. Volkow, Director, National Institute on Drug Abuse 
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations testified that  
 
The misuse of opioids is … a public health epidemic with 
devastating consequences including not just opioid use 
disorders and related overdoses, but also the rising 
incidence of newborns who experience neonatal abstinence 
syndrome because their mothers used these substances 
during pregnancy; and increased spread of infectious 
diseases including HIV and hepatitis C (HCV). 
 
Existing evidence based prevention and treatment 
strategies are highly underutilized across the United States. 
The recently announced initiative …emphasizes the 
implementation of these evidence based prevention and 
treatment strategies which include not only better 
prescription practices but also deployment of medication to 
combat overdoses and medication‑assisted treatment 
(MAT) to treat opioid use disorders. … [This] initiative and 
will focus on supporting research and disseminating 
findings to improve opioid prescribing practices, to expand 
the use of the opioid overdose reversal drug naloxone, to 
improve the integration of pharmacotherapies into 
treatment services in specialty care and primary care, and 
to develop pain treatments with reduced potential for 
misuse and diversion. 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/about-nida/legislative-activities/testimony-to-
congress/2016/what-federal-government-doing-to-combat-opioid-abuse-epidemic 
Given that the government has to be involved in regulating drugs, it is imperative 
that they do so effectively. Being better off than the Wild West drug market of the late 
18th century is hardly a success. Even though we are clearly better off today than before 
any drug control was in place, the staggering death rate from prescription drugs shows 
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that today’s form of drug control is inadequate and must be improved. The government is 
obligated to enact effective policy. The fact that more people in the US die from medicine 
prescribed by a doctor than from illicit cocaine and heroin combined is frequently framed 
as a success for illicit drug control. In fact it is a clear sign that the medical community 
and prescription drug system urgently needs to be reformed. The current drug policy 
from the White House emphasizes specifically that the preferred intervention for 
prescription drug abuse should be to improve information sharing, in other words to 
establish PDMPs. 
Very recent policy proposals reflect a growing awareness of the need for 
government intervention. In Oct 2015 Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker proposed a 
bill that would limit practitioners to prescribing no more than a 72-hour supply of opioids 
to patients the first time they prescribe an opioid to them. In Feb 2016 The White House 
proposed $1 billion in new funding over two years to fight heroin and prescription drug 
abuse.  Almost all of the new money, $920 million, would be for mandatory funding over 
two years for states to increase medication-assisted treatment, which also involves 
therapy, for people with opioid use disorders.   
(http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/267895-white-house-proposes-1-billion-to-fight-opioid-epidemic) 
 
Also in Feb 2016 the National Governors Association, frustrated by a perceived 
lack of effective action, resolved to propose treatment protocols to reduce the use of 
opioid painkillers. (http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/22/us/politics/governors-devise-bipartisan-effort-
to-reduce-opioid-abuse.html?_r=0) In March 2016 the CDC issued comprehensive new 
guidelines for the prescription of opioids for chronic pain (Dowell, Haegerich, and Chou, 
2016). These guidelines addressed many of the issues raised in this thesis, specifically (1) 
when to initiate or continue opioids for chronic pain, (2) opioid selection, dosage, 
duration, follow-up, and discontinuation, and (3) the risks and harms of opioid use. 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/rr/rr6501e1.htm 
 
2.3 Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs: The rationale for New York Attorney 
General Eric T. Schneiderman’s 2012 proposal to address the prescription drug crisis was 
that a modernization of the state’s Prescription Monitoring Program  
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would exponentially enhance the effectiveness of New 
York’s existing PMP to increase detection of prescription 
fraud and drug diversion [and] establish an on-line, real-
time, controlled substance reporting system that requires 
prescribers and pharmacists to search for and report 
certain data at the time a controlled substance prescription 
is issued, and at the time such substance is dispensed.  
https://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/press-releases/2012/ISTOP%20REPORT%20FINAL%201.10.12.pdf 
The legislation, which passed both Assembly and Senate unanimously in June 
2012:  
 requires the Department of Health to establish and maintain an on-line, real-time 
controlled substance reporting system to track the prescription and dispensing of 
controlled substances;  
 requires practitioners to review a patient's controlled substance prescription 
history on the system prior to prescribing;  
 requires practitioners or their agents to report a prescription for such controlled 
substances to the system at the time of issuance;  
 requires pharmacists to review the system to confirm the person presenting such a 
prescription possesses a legitimate prescription prior to dispensing such 
substance;  
 requires pharmacists or their agents to report dispensation of such prescriptions at 
the time the drug is dispensed.  
With the introduction of I-STOP, New York State has mandated the involvement 
of prescription writers in PDMPs along with the pharmacies that fill those prescriptions. 
Now, with very few exceptions, whenever a medical professional writes a prescription in 
New York State they must first check I-STOP to look for suspicious behavior. This new 
regulation is intended to fight doctor shopping, where a patient seeks drugs from many 
different doctors in a short span of time either to source serious personal abuse or to sell 
the drugs. With the extra involvement of doctors this behavior should be discovered. 
However it will require extra time from the doctors, and the extra scrutiny and effort may 
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result in doctors writing fewer legitimate prescriptions. In turn people with legitimate 
medical needs may not receive medicine. In this thesis I will evaluate I-STOP’s 
effectiveness. A particular focus will be the mandated involvement of prescription 
writers. The newness of I-STOP limits the amount of data available. The opportunities 
inherent in cross-state comparisons led me to the methodology used in this paper. 
 
The Federal Government funds substance abuse surveys (e.g., the National 
Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) 
https://nsduhweb.rti.org/respweb/project_description.html). Criminal justice departments, 
hospitals and health departments at the state and federal level also collect data. The rising 
abuse of prescription drugs has been identified in all of these different sources. These 
sources of data can also serve to help evaluate the effects of PDMPs. By looking at the 
admission to emergency rooms for overdoses, drug arrests, and drug related deaths, in 
different states, before and after the implementation of different forms of PDMPs, we can 
hope to get a look at how effective the different policies are. The PDMPs themselves will 
also serve as sources of data.  
 
For example, the BJA Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Performance 
Measures Report states that:  
 
The performance measures ask for the number of patients 
who have obtained prescriptions from five or more 
prescribers and filled them at five or more pharmacies in 
each reporting period (initially, six months; after July 1, 
2010, three months). The measures also ask for the number 
of non-liquid doses associated with these patients, broken 
out by drug class—pain relievers, sedatives, stimulants, 
and tranquilizers. We report these threshold measures as 
ratios—of the number of patients meeting the five 
prescriber/five pharmacy threshold to the total number of 
patients who received a prescription during the reporting 
period, and of the number of non-liquid doses associated 
with the threshold-meeting patients to the total number of 
non-liquid doses dispensed in the reporting period, overall 
and by drug class. A parallel set of performance measures, 
and ratios, is based on a 10 prescriber and 10 pharmacy 
threshold. Each of these measures is asked for Schedule II 
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prescriptions only, Schedule II and III prescriptions only, 
and Schedule II, III, and IV prescriptions.  These threshold 
measures are thought to be indicators of questionable 
activity.  
 
Terminology and Methodology. In my literature search I made a complete 
searches for the terms “doctor shopping”, “bad doctors”, “stolen scripts”, “opioid 
prescription surveys”, “prescription opioid deaths”, “opioid epidemic”, “pill mills” and 
“prescription mills”.  
 
Footnote: The latter two terms, “pill mills” and “prescription mills” are used to 
describe doctors’ offices that specialize in freely providing opioid prescriptions with lax 
or no checks in place. For example, Florida was plagued by such operations until 
recently. Specifically, 49 of the 50 largest prescribers in the USA were located within two 
Florida counties. In 2010 and 2011 Florida took important legislative and enforcement 
steps to bring the problem under a degree of control. $3M was allocated for enforcement 
in Florida House Bill 7095 which  
 
provides mandatory administrative penalties for certain 
violations related to prescribing; requires prescriptions for 
controlled substances to be written on counterfeit-resistant 
pad produced by approved vendor or electronically 
prescribed; provides conditions for being approved vendor; 
requires certain physicians to designate themselves as 
controlled substance prescribing practitioners on their 
practitioner profiles.  
 
The enforcement effort was sweeping. As reported in the press,  
 
Agents went undercover and posed as patients. They tapped 
phones to record calls and text messages. They seized 
security video from cameras installed by the owners of the 
clinics, recorded their own undercover videos and used the 
IRS to follow the money. They eventually raided the South 
Florida clinics, known as ‘pill mills,’ and amassed more 
than 1.2 million pages of records and statements… 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/06/south-florida-pill-mill_n_3553196.html 
--- end of footnote 
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The papers identified in these literature searches show there is a strong consensus         
that  
access to healthcare generally, and to dentists and 
pharmacists in particular, increases the availability of 
prescription opioids in communities, which, in turn, is 
associated with higher rates of opioid abuse” (Wright et al 
2014). 
 
That is, that the opioid epidemic is (at least in part) a self-inflicted problem within 
the health care system. 
 
Efforts to implement PDMPs are under way across the nation. There are many 
papers that discuss the evaluation of their effectiveness, but the quality of such studies 
has so far been poor. In a comprehensive literature review, Haegerlich et al (2014) 
searched for evaluations of state policy or systems-level interventions that used “non-
comparative, cross-sectional, before–after, time series, cohort, or comparison group 
designs or randomized/non-randomized trials”. They confirmed that overall study quality 
is low, and identified limitations including  
 
lack of baseline data and comparison groups, inadequate 
statistical testing, small sample sizes, self-reported 
outcomes, and short-term follow-up. 
 
Often the scope of these evaluative studies lies within a single state. In this thesis 
I take the view that inter-comparison of data from different states provides an important 
opportunity to identify policies and practices that will improve prescribing practices and 
opioid use protocols, both of which are crucial to the protection of patient health.  
 
Responsibility for monitoring and controlling prescription drugs lies at the level 
of the state. There are large differences both in the time and in the specifics of 
implementation from state to state. This means that in practice fifty different experiments 
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are being conducted on how to build a PDMP. Table 1 shows examples of variations in 
PDMP implementation by state (from http://www.pdmpassist.org). 
 
Table 1: Examples of Variations in Implementation of PDMPs by State 
Empty fields mean the program may be recently established and/or may not yet be collecting data. 
       
       
 #Prescribers #Pharmacies #Prescriptions Frequency Agency Type Start 
Alabama 15,178 1,437 13,703,512 Daily Department of Health 2006 
Alaska 4,364 107 585,290 Monthly Pharmacy Board 2011 
Arizona 28,970 1,162  Daily Pharmacy Board 2008 
Arkansas 10,059 775  Weekly Department of Health 2013 
California 166,333 6,337 45,136,908 Weekly Law Enforcement Agency 1939 
Colorado 25,787 820  Daily Pharmacy Board 2007 
Connecticut 21,476 689  Daily Consumer Protection Agency 2008 
Delaware 4,733 223  Daily Professional Licensing Agency 2012 
Florida 67,588 4,882 24,842,120 Weekly Department of Health 2011 
Georgia 34,973 2,429  Weekly Law Enforcement Agency 2013 
Guam 253 24  Bi-Weekly Department of Health 2013 
Hawaii 6,343 245  Weekly Law Enforcement Agency 1943 
Idaho 7,204 313 2,599,175 Weekly Pharmacy Board 1967 
Illinois 54,404 2,414 17,578,503 Daily Department of Health 1968 
Indiana 25,991 1,275 12,922,497 Weekly Professional Licensing Agency 1998 
Iowa 13,989 778 4,499,508 Weekly Pharmacy Board 2009 
Ka  Kansas 13,894 673  Daily Pharmacy Board 2011 
Kentucky 17,425 1,162  Daily Other 1999 
Louisiana 17,168 1,230 12,723,870 Daily Pharmacy Board 2008 
Maine 7,484 313 2,532,441 Daily Substance Abuse Agency 2004 
Maryland 30,906 1,232  3  Days Substance Abuse Agency 2013 
Massachusetts 43,115 1,170  Daily Department of Health 1994 
Michigan 43,139 2,480  Daily Professional Licensing Agency 1989 
Minnesota 27,806 1,130 6,700,000 Daily Pharmacy Board 2010 
Mississippi 10,293 840 6,000,000 Daily Pharmacy Board 2005 
Missouri 22,430 1,318     
Montana 5,102 269  Weekly Pharmacy Board 2012 
Nebraska 9,429 499  Daily Other 2011 
Nevada 9,846 475 3,932,259 Daily Pharmacy Board 1997 
New Hampshire 7,697 270  Weekly Pharmacy Board 2014 
New Jersey 44,064 2,048 4,000,606 Weekly Law Enforcement Agency 2011 
New Mexico 9,627 329  Daily Pharmacy Board 2005 
New York 108,256 5,019  Daily Department of Health 1973 
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Oregon 19,793 730  Weekly Department of Health 2011 
Pennsylvania 63,002 3,203 6,000,000 3  Days Department of Health 1973 
Rhode Island 5,881 208  3  Days Department of Health 1979 
South Carolina 18,589 1,154  Daily Department of Health 2008 
Tennessee 30,064 1,676  Daily Pharmacy Board 2006 
Texas 91,727 5,223 41,440,478 Weekly Law Enforcement Agency 1982 
Utah 12,082 540 5,409,785 Daily Professional Licensing Agency 1996 
Vermont 3,707 157  Weekly Department of Health 2009 
Virginia 38,227 1,635  Weekly Professional Licensing Agency 2003 
Washington 37,145 1,280 3,614,306 Weekly Department of Health 2011 
West Virginia 8,052 584  Daily Pharmacy Board 1995 
Wisconsin 28,273 1,152  Weekly Pharmacy Board 2013 
Wyoming 2,641 126  Weekly Pharmacy Board 2004 
       
Crucially, participation in PDMPs by prescribers and pharmacies is not 
mandatory in every state. The impact of this very important factor will be considered in 
detail later. 
 
2.4 PDMP Performance Measures: In 2005, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) 
convened state representatives and BJA consultants to develop performance measures 
for PDMPs. Over the following three years, an initial set of measures was adopted, 
consistent with federal reporting requirements mandated by the Government 
Performance Results Act (Bureau of Justice Assistance 2013). Measures were 
developed in each of four areas: input, output, outcomes and impacts.  
 
Inputs include training of prescribers, dispensers, and individuals authorized to 
conduct investigations in how to access and use PDMP data. 
  
Outputs are solicited reports in response to a request from a prescriber, 
pharmacist, investigator, regulatory agency or other authorized end user of the PDMP, 
while unsolicited reports result from the PDMP’s having identified questionable 
prescription patterns.  
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Outcomes focus is on consumers who fill prescriptions in a manner that may 
indicate inappropriate use of prescription drugs. Measures in this area relate to the 
number of individuals who exceed certain thresholds of prescribers and pharmacies, and 
to the number of doses of drugs associated with these individuals.  
 
The primary impact measure is the prevalence of inappropriate use of 
prescription drugs by the general population, to be obtained from the National Survey 
on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH). Secondary impact measures are overdoses and 
deaths attributable to misuse of controlled substances. Reporting on these measures 
has been required of BJA Harold Rogers PDMP grantees beginning in 2008 (see 
chapter 6). The measures have been update and improved since that time, as described 
in the next section. 
 
The first comprehensive compilation of the measures, across the three and one-
half years from January 2009 through June 2012 showed: 
• grantees provided formal trainings to several hundred prescribers and somewhat 
fewer pharmacists over a typical 12-month period,  
• registration rates increasing for four or more years after implementation of online 
access, reaching an average of 58% in the first half of 2012 for the six states where 
online access began prior to 2007,  
• large increases in the number of solicited reports provided to in-state prescribers 
(more than 400%), pharmacists (more than 200%), and law enforcement (more than 
100%), and  
• rates of individuals who had obtained Schedule II prescriptions from five or more 
prescribers and five or more pharmacies in a three-month reporting  period less than 
1/10th of 1%. 
http://www.pdmpexcellence.org/sites/all/pdfs/BJA_PDMP_Performance_Measures_1_09_6_12_fdbk.pdf  
 
This report also contained the following extraordinary paragraph:  
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We explored associations between non-medical use of 
pain relievers and rates of drug-related overdose deaths 
for the grantee states. We found that all years of non-
medical use were correlated with all years of overdose 
death rates. However, the highest correlations were 
between non-medical use in 2002/2003 and overdose 
death rates in 2008, 2009, and 2010 (correlation 
coefficients of .725, .747, and .754, respectively). (The 
correlation between non-medical use in 2009/2010 and 
overdose death rates in 2010 was .654.) This finding 
suggests that the relationship between these two impact 
measures may be complex…  
 
This empirically determined time lag of several years in the correlation 
between non-medical use of opioids and overdose deaths is one of the strong 
motivations for the construction of my System Dynamics model below: specifically, 
my model shows that the mean time from initial opioid addiction to death is several 
years. 
 
2.5 Support for and Continuous Improvement of PDMPs: The PDMP Training and 
Technical Assistance Center (PDMP-TTAC) is a partnership between the Bureau of 
Justice Assistance (BJA) and the Heller School for Social Policy & Management at 
Brandeis University. The PDMP-TTAC provides assistance with developing policy and 
information for PDMPs, collecting and reporting performance measurements, hosting 
regional and national conferences, participating in interstate data sharing, and planning & 
implementing new PDMPs. 
http://pdmpassist.org/content/about-training-and-technical-assistance-center-ttac 
Since 2010, the TTAC has conducted three State Surveys of PDMPs (2010, 2012, 
2014). The surveys have gathered data on PDMP statutes, regulations, policies and 
procedures, tracked their changes over time, and identified program trends and candidate 
practices. In September 2012, the PDMP Center of Excellence (COE) published a white 
paper entitled “Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs: An Assessment of the Evidence 
for Best Practices”. Drawing on published research, consensus statements of expert 
opinion, and accumulated experience among states, this report identified 35 best and 
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promising practices likely to help maximize PDMP effectiveness. These fell into 7 major 
categories:  
Data collection and data quality  
Data linking and analysis  
User access and report dissemination  
PDMP recruitment, utilization, and education  
Inter-organizational best practices for PDMPs  
Evaluation of PDMPs  
Funding PDMPs  http://pdmpassist.org/pdf/state_survey_comparisons_TAG_FINAL_20151222.pdf 
The best practices identified and recommended for implementation in all PDMPs were:  
Collect positive identification for the person picking up prescriptions  
Collect data on method of payment, including cash transactions  
Reduce data collection interval; move toward real-time data collection  
Integrate PDMP reports with health information exchanges, electronic health 
records, and pharmacy dispensing systems  
Send unsolicited reports and alerts to appropriate users  
Mandate enrollment  
Mandate utilization  
Delegate Access  
Enact and implement interstate data sharing among PDMPs  
Secure funding independent of economic downturns, conflicts of interest, public 
policy changes, and changes in PDMP policies  
A federal program created by the FY 2002 U.S. Department of Justice Appropriations 
Act (Public Law 107-77) and continued to date under each subsequent year’s 
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Appropriations Act -- the Harold Rogers Prescription Drug Monitoring Program -- 
supports competitive proposals “to enhance the capacity of regulatory and law 
enforcement agencies and public health officials to collect and analyze controlled 
substance prescription data and other scheduled chemical products through a centralized 
database administered by an authorized state agency”. 
https://www.bja.gov/Funding/13PDMPsol.pdf 
Funding is a perennial problem for PDMPs, because there is no steady supply. 
Some states prohibit using general state revenues for the programs. Private funding 
supports some PDMPs, but many are supported only by federal grants. There have only 
been two Federal PDMP grant-funding programs. The Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) administered The National All Schedules 
Prescription Electronic Reporting (NASPER) grant. No funds have been appropriated for 
the NASPER program since fiscal years 2009 and 2010, and NASPER grants are not 
currently available. The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) Harold Rogers PDMP Grant 
Program (HRPDMP) has made grants available to states since 2003 for the purpose of 
planning, implementing and enhancing PDMPs. HRPDMP grant programs, however, are 
a competition between states. They generally place a limit on the amount a state many 
receive. They specify a funding period, and place restrictions on how the funds are to be 
used. A state receiving an HRPDMP grant may not be eligible for future support.  
A state’s legislature may allocate General Revenue funds for a PDMP. General 
revenue funds come from state sales, income, and property taxes. The demands on state 
revenues are many and the funds are limited. Passing legislation allocating sufficient 
funds for PDMP operation requires persistent advocacy by those who might benefit from 
effective prescription monitoring. Examples are medical groups and law enforcement. 
The NYS AG testified in his case for I-STOP that 1/5th of the state budget in the years 
leading up to I-STOP was spent on dealing with consequences of the opioid epidemic. He 
suggested that savings from dealing with this epidemic effectively could offset some or 
all of the costs incurred by I-STOP. This argument could also be advanced in every state. 
http://www.pdmpassist.org/pdf/PDMP_Funding_Options_TAG.pdf 
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In order to be effective PDMPs’ prescription data must be completely and 
accurately collected, analyzed appropriately, and made available in a proactive and 
timely manner to all appropriate end users. Prescription data generally include 
information on the date written and dispensed, patient, prescriber, pharmacy, medicine, 
day’s supply, dose, and source of payment. PDMP reports are made available on request 
from end users. These are typically prescribers and pharmacists, but also include medical 
licensure boards, law enforcement and drug control agencies, medical examiners, drug 
courts, addiction treatment programs, and, in some states, third party payers. 
http://www.pdmpexcellence.org/sites/all/pdfs/Brandeis_COE_PDMP_3rd_pty_payer_mtg_rpt.pdf 
 
2.6 The Tension between Treatment of Pain and Regulation of Abuse: The regulatory 
ideas inherent in PDMPs and regulation in general, unless implemented with great 
subtlety and forethought, will run headlong into the problems both of actually causing 
under-treatment and of being accused of causing under-treatment by those eager to 
proliferate the use of opioids.  
 
An underlying belief implicit in the creation of PDMPs is that of the “bad 
patient”, a villain whose drug-seeking propensities must be held in check by regulation. 
Certainly such characters exist (Inciardi et al 2007). An assessment of blame throughout 
the entire supply chain for prescription drug abuse, however, must include many other 
actors, including doctors, dentists, pharmacists, family members (of both negligent and 
well-intentioned types), robbers, and drug pushers (of both criminal and other types). 
Chief among the advocates for increased use of opioids are the drug 
manufacturers. One specific brand, OxyContin, was marketed with unprecedented vigor 
under the (later proved to be false) claim that it had less than a 1% chance of leading to 
addiction. After protracted investigations before congress (“EXAMINING THE 
EFFECTS OF THE PAINKILLER OXYCONTIN, FOCUSING ON FEDERAL, STATE 
AND LOCAL EFFORTS TO DECREASE ABUSE AND MISUSE OF THIS 
PRODUCT WHILE ASSURING AVAILABILITY FOR PATIENTS WHO SUFFER 
DAILY FROM CHRONIC MODERATE TO SEVERE PAIN” February 12, 2002) the 
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manufacturers of OxyContin, Purdue Pharma, eventually pleaded guilty in 2007 to the 
criminal charge of “misbranding” the product and agreed to pay $600 million in fines. 
By then the damage was done. Furthermore, as part of the settlement, the GAO 
(General Accounting Office) recommendations stated, “In addition to developing a risk 
management plan, Purdue has initiated several OxyContin-related educational programs. 
They have taken disciplinary action against their own sales representatives who they say 
improperly promoted OxyContin. They have referred physicians suspected of improper 
prescribing practices to the authorities”. In this way they have succeeded in perpetuating 
a system by which they, the manufacturers, are allowed to “educate” doctors and others 
to market their products. Such education is a major factor in creating a climate of opinion 
in which doctors freely prescribe opioids; it began decades ago, and its influence still 
persists to this day in medical schools and doctor’s offices. 
The role of the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) has been similarly 
compromised through “education” and the provision of funding from the pharmaceutical 
industry. The FDA approved OxyContin labeling that read, “Delayed absorption, as 
provided by OxyContin tablets is believed to reduce the abuse liability of a drug.” In 
retrospect it is also clear that the approved labeling contained a recipe for abuse:  
OxyContin tablets are to be swallowed whole, and are not 
to be broken, chewed, or crushed. Swallowing broken, 
chewed, or crushed OxyContin tablets could lead to the 
rapid release and absorption of a potentially toxic dose of 
oxycodone. 
The medical community has long used four primary vital signs: body temperature, 
blood pressure, pulse (heart rate), and breathing rate (respiratory rate) to monitor a 
patient’s condition. In 1996, coincident with the aggressive marketing of OxyContin, the 
American Pain Society (APS) created the idea of “pain as the 5th vital sign”.  James 
Campbell, in his presidential address, said,  
Vital Signs are taken seriously. If pain were assessed with 
the same zeal as other vital signs are, it would have a much 
better chance of being treated properly. We need to train 
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doctors and nurses to treat pain as a vital sign. Quality 
care means that pain is measured and treated.  
The logic of this syllogism – vital signs are taken seriously; pain is a vital sign; 
therefore pain is taken seriously -- so appealed to the Veterans Health Administration 
(VHA) that they created a task force to initiate “a comprehensive national strategy for 
pain management” based upon it. Thus was born the VHA’s “Pain as the Fifth Vital Sign 
Toolkit” 
http://www.va.gov/PAINMANAGEMENT/docs/Pain_As_the_5th_Vital_Sign_Toolkit.pdf  
Many of us have direct personal experience of the protocol “requiring a pain 
intensity rating (0 to 10) at all clinical encounters.” The idea of pain as the 5th vital sign 
made so much sense to so many people that it spread like wildfire. It led to proliferation 
in the use of opioids, and to patients demanding opioids as a right.  
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3. Research Questions  
 
There are clear recurrent trends shown by my literature review of opioid use that lead to 
the questions to be addressed in this thesis. For much more than a century people have 
persistently used opioids, and during all of that time the use of opioids has been justified 
by arguments implying their safety and efficacy. President Nixon was just one in a long 
line of apologists claiming extenuating circumstances for continued opioid production. 
Purdue Pharma is merely the latest. The historical perspective is therefore that the opioid 
problem is likely to prove intractable, and that PDMPs will face familiar pitfalls. 
 
Given that people will use opioids, the pressing questions facing PDMPs become 
(1) when should doctors initiate or continue opioids for chronic pain, (2) what are the 
appropriate strategies for opioid dosage, duration, and discontinuation, and (3) what are 
the risks and harms of opioid use? 
 
Given that people will abuse opioids, which of the possible modalities of abuse 
should raise greatest concern? The possibilities include doctor shopping, sharing of drugs 
by family and friends, purchase of drugs from dealers, and transitioning from prescription 
drugs to heroin. 
 
My review has shown that, before government regulation, many people died or became 
terribly addicted to substances whose dangers they did not understand. We are better off 
today than before drug control began, but the situation is extremely problematic. Given 
that the government has to be involved in regulating drugs, it is imperative that they do so 
effectively. The current drug policy from the White House emphasizes specifically that 
the preferred intervention for prescription drug abuse should be to improve information 
sharing, in other words to establish PDMPs. 
 
Information sharing in the information age naturally means online Prescription 
Drug Monitoring Programs. With I-STOP, New York State has mandated the 
involvement of prescription writers in PDMPs, along with the pharmacies that fill those 
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prescriptions, with a primary intent to fight doctor shopping. A particular focus is the 
mandated involvement of prescription writers. Specifically, are PDMPs more effective 
when mandatory?  
 
The near-simultaneous launch of PDMPs in almost every state provides important 
contrasting data, both because each state has its own perspective on the best way to 
proceed, and because the specific problems of the opioid epidemic are different in 
different states. The intrinsic opportunities inherent in cross-state comparisons led me to 
the methodology used in this thesis. 
 
There are identifiable problems with mandatory regulation. Compliance will 
require extra time from the doctors. The extra scrutiny and extra effort may result in 
doctors writing fewer legitimate prescriptions. Attempts to curb usage means that people 
with legitimate medical needs may not receive medicine.  
 
Which, if any, of the possible metrics for PDMP performance found in the literature 
will prove most effective? The possibilities include (1) reports that respond to 
requests from a prescriber, a pharmacist, an investigator, a regulatory agency or 
another authorized end user of the PDMP, (2) patterns in the data from the PDMP’s 
having questionable prescription behaviors, such as consumers who fill prescriptions 
in a manner that may indicate inappropriate use of prescription drugs, or the number of 
individuals who exceed certain thresholds of prescribers and pharmacies, or the number 
of doses of drugs associated with these individuals (3) a prevalence of inappropriate 
use of prescription drugs by the general population, or (4) overdoses and deaths 
attributable to misuse of controlled substances.  
 
 In this thesis I will construct, analyze, calibrate, and extrapolate a system 
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1. Are Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs an effective tool in curbing opioid 
abuse? 
 
2. How does the mandatory use of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs affect 
the supply of opioids to long-term pain sufferers, many of whom already contend 
that their pain is under-treated? 
 
3. How large a factor in the opioid epidemic is sharing of drugs with family and 
friends? 
 
4. Does a System Dynamics analysis provide an adequate description for the onset 









4.1 A System Dynamics Approach: In order to evaluate I-STOP and the effectiveness of 
PDMPs I will first establish a system dynamics model of prescription drug distribution 
and use, and the opioid addiction that results. The model will show how the treatment of 
pain and the diversion of drugs interact with each other. Once this model is established 
and calibrated, I will introduce into it different instances of PDMPs based on actual 
practices within individual US states. For example, some states mandate use of PDMPs 
while others do not. These variations in the implementation of PDMPs lead to variation 
in outcomes from the model I have created. The resultant set of model outcomes and 
extrapolation of the models to more extreme parameter values is the basis for my 
sensitivity analysis. 
 
4.2 The Complexities of Addiction: Opioids are addictive, and so, whenever an 
individual first takes a prescription pain pill, for whatever reason (legal or illegal, given 
by a friend or family member, sold by a drug dealer, stolen, prescribed by a well-
intentioned doctor or dentist, delivered as part of post-operative care, or for any other 
reason whatsoever), there is a chance of addiction. Therefore a fundamental strategy for 
this study will be to follow the trajectory of the pills from creation to consumption, an 
approach that will also provide a robust test of my assumption that any exposure to 
opioids carries an inherent risk of addiction. 
The title of the GAO hearing quoted in section 2.6 contained an interesting 
statement of the problem: “…TO DECREASE ABUSE AND MISUSE … WHILE 
ASSURING AVAILABILITY FOR PATIENTS WHO SUFFER DAILY FROM 
CHRONIC MODERATE TO SEVERE PAIN.” 
This is only one of many examples of the kind of dichotomy inherent in the 
opioid epidemic: in this case, to decrease supply (abuse) while ensuring supply (to pain 
sufferers). In order to tease apart the numerous often-conflicting interests and motives 
involved in the opioid epidemic, a useful tactic is to model the extremes of a distribution 
as two populations, for example long-term and short-term pain sufferers, heavy and light 
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drug users, under-supplied and over-supplied patients, parsimonious and profligate 
prescribers, and so on. This simplifying assumption proves sufficient to explain important 
trends, and facilitates construction of a model simple enough to appreciate intuitively yet 
robust enough to make specific policy predictions, in line with the standards and 
expectations of the System Dynamics modeling community (Sterman 2000). 
The literature on the opioid epidemic abounds with examples of presuppositions 
that result from narrowness of focus regarding such inherently dichotomous distributions, 
when typically only one half of the distribution is considered. Examples include the 
stigmatization of some opioid dependent patients as blameworthy rather than as 
inadvertent and unknowing victims, and the failure to appreciate that some doctor 
shoppers want more drugs to treat their pain while others want more drugs to sell from 
their prescriptions for financial gain. Another important reason to build a system 
dynamics model is to address dichotomous issues of this kind. 
Tracking the prescription drugs from the doctors’ offices leads directly to two 
kinds of opioid patients. The first are those with long-term pain and increasing tolerance 
to opioids. The second are those with short-term needs from sports injury, dental 
procedures, minor surgery, falls, and so on. On first examination it might seem sufficient 
to model the latter class of patients as the source for all proliferation of opioids into 
society, simply because they often have pills left over from their prescription. Meanwhile 
the long-term pain patients, especially because they become increasingly habituated to 
the drug over time, will generally consume all of their prescriptions.  
While this is perhaps a reasonable first approximation, the reality is considerably 
more complex. Long-term pain sufferers may choose to sell some or all their prescription, 
suffer targeted theft, or choose to give pills to friends and family despite the pain 
(Inciardi et al 2007). Some short-term pain patients may dispose of their prescription pill 
excesses responsibly (Baumblatt et al 2014).  
For the purposes of modeling I therefore distinguish two trajectories from the 
doctors’ office: one into homes with a de facto excess of pills available for distribution, 
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and the other into homes where the primary users consumes the entire prescription. The 
fraction of prescriptions entering each of these two channels is empirically determinable 
through comparison between the model and published data. There are huge variations in 
the numerical value of this fraction from place to place and over time. Factors including 
the doctors’ susceptibility to persistent marketing and their prior education regarding 
opioids, the rate at which doctors write prescriptions, and the number of prescriptions 
they write per patient all affect the number of pills leaving their offices. Meanwhile the 
activities of the patients in requiring drugs (such as feigning pain, doctor shopping, 
current degree of opioid dependency, or refusing to take opioids because of concerns 
about their risks) affect the number of pills received by patients. 
Evidence accumulated over the past two decades shows the use of opioids in the 
United States springing up in isolated pockets, increasing over time, and spreading into 
adjacent geographic regions exactly like a contagious disease, and therefore amply 
justifying the term “epidemic” to describe its course.  
4.3 Lessons from Prior Epidemics: Prior drug epidemics have been successfully 
modeled (Everingham & Rydell, 1994; Caulkins, 2002) by the assumed existence of two 
populations of users (usually called “light users” and “heavy users”) initiated into drug 
use and so entering the light user class, with a few subsequently escalating over time into 
heavy use. The ability of such simple models to fit the data on initiation and use (of 
cocaine in the references cited), using only three parameters (rate of quitting from light 
use, escalation from light to heavy use, and rate of quitting from heavy use) is impressive, 
and part of the inspiration for the approach taken in this work. 
  
Figure 2: Model #1. Implementation of the Everingham & Rydell and Caulkins model. 
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My implementation of the Everingham & Rydell and Caulkins model is shown in 
Fig 2. The arrow on the left side of the figure indicates the boundary of the model, 
beginning with initiation. As expected, my implementation (Model #1) can successfully 
reproduce the published results of Everingham & Rydell (1994) and Caulkins (2002). In 
subsequent sections of this thesis I will model the system that causes and sustains the 
opioid epidemic. With that model in hand, I will then be in position to investigate the 
effectiveness of PDMPs through sensitivity analyses within the world of the model in 
which variables that describe the behavior of the actors in the model are adjusted between 
two perceived extremes. 
4.4 Modeling the Opioid Epidemic: I begin my modeling of opioid addiction with a 
specific focus on illicit use. Time series data documenting the rate of initiation into the 
illicit use of opioids (http://www.samhsa.gov/data/) are published annually, as are death 
rates from opioid poisoning (CDC_Deaths.pdf). Having developed a preliminary model 
for the addiction component of the system, I proceed to construct the rest of the opioid 
epidemic system model in a series of logical steps. In particular, I add components to the 
system motived by answers to three questions:  
• Where specifically are the doctor-prescribed drugs consumed or hoarded? 
• When the user’s appetite grows, where do the additional drugs come from? 
• If doctors, having habituated their patients, turn off the supply, how will their patients 
react? 
 
Despite a welter of confusion about possible causes, effects, and trends in the 
published opioid epidemic literature, I found it possible to identify a set of six self-
consistent assumptions, listed below, from which I built my system dynamics model in 
several steps. Working in steps helped me to think through the logic of the model. 
Calibration of the variables in the model will be accomplished from comparison with 
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The six assumptions underlying my System Dynamics modeling are: 
 
1. A population exposed to opioids exhibits dependency and death at an empirically 
determinable rate. The original reason for exposure to opioids is not a factor. 
 
2. When the number of pills prescribed exceeds patient needs, exposure of family 
and friends leads to non-medical use. Initially the excess of pills is greater than 
any demand for this diversion of supply.  
 
3. Recreational users supplied by family and friends give pills to their peers. Initially 
the excess of pills is greater than any demand for this diversion of supply. 
 
4. As tolerance to the drug grows in an individual dependent user, doctor shopping 
arises in order to meet increasing individual need. 
 
5. For long-term pain sufferers who develop dependency, their supply from a single 
doctor becomes insufficient to meet their needs. Patients with expectations that 
this need should be fulfilled within the medical system voice complaints about 
under-treatment while the world nevertheless sees an ongoing epidemic. 
 
6. The purity and reputable source of pharmaceutical opioids makes them preferable 
to heroin when they are free and readily available. When cost and scarcity become 
factors, use of heroin (which is cheaper but riskier) rises. 
 
Step 1 implements my assumption number 1: A population exposed to opioids exhibits 
dependency and death at an empirically determinable rate. The original reason for 
exposure to opioids is not a factor. 
I first extended the model of Figure 2 to begin consideration of opioid deaths, 
shown in Figure 3. The input data (initial use of illicit drugs, http://www.samhsa.gov/data/ ) 
are entered into the model through tabulation in a text file (called OpioidTimeSeries) that 
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lists year and annual initiation rate. The inclusion of a mortality rate for heavy users 
(called rate of heavy users dying) completes this naïve opioid addiction and death model. 
The reason for the omission of a mortality rate for light users is explained below. 
 
Figure 3: Model #2 Light and Heavy Users; Deaths from Heavy User Population 
What values should be used for the rates of quitting from light and heavy drug 
use, and for the rate of escalation to investigate the opioid data? Close examination of the 
epidemic trend lines gives a clue. Both the opioid prescription rate and the opioid death 
rate had been slowly growing since the 1970s but an abrupt steepening, signaling the 
onset of the epidemic, happened around the year 2000. 
The uptick in prescription rate from aggressive OxyContin marketing surged in 
1997 (as data from the GAO hearings, described in section 2.6, confirm). Equally clearly, 
the sudden change in slope of the death rates trajectory happened later: specifically, in the 
year 2001. This lag in response is characteristic of stock and flow models, where 
accumulation (in this case, of opioid users) precedes an observed flow (here “deaths”). 
That is, in a model of this kind, it takes some time for users to transition to the points of 
addiction, overdose, and death. 
 
The data from the cocaine epidemic of the 1980s (cited above) showed similar 
behavior. Because both cocaine use and opioid use lead to physiological addiction, I 
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hypothesized that the rate coefficients might be similar in the two epidemics, and so I had 
the idea to begin with precisely those (cocaine-determined) escalation and quitting 
parameters as a first guess with which to attempt to model the opioid data. 
 
 
Figure 4: Model #2 output vs CDC data  
 
Graphs of number of heavy users of opioids and number of light users of opioids 
generated from this model are shown in figure 4 (upper). Because the appearance of the 
curves for each of these two classes of users turns out to be significantly different, a 
simple comparison of the appearance of these graphs with a plot of annual number of 
deaths from opioids (figure 4, center, dashed line) yields an interesting result -- the model 
curve for the number of heavy users of opioids is similar in appearance (in both time of 
onset and rate of increase) to the curve for number of deaths. Yet the curve for number of 
light users of opioids -- specifically, with regard to the time of onset of the steep rise in 
numbers of opioid users and the persistence of upward trend all the way to the end of the 
time line – is very different. 
 
Therefore, within this simple model, and assuming a constant rate of deaths per 
user population, the deaths are found to arise preponderantly from the heavy user 
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population. This allows an immediate calculation of a value for my model parameter 
“rate of death of heavy user” from a ratio of the death rate to the number of heavy users. 
That ratio is indeed constant with time (the curves of the two quantities are the same 
shape) and corresponds to an annual probability of one death per 133 heavy users.  
 
This numerical result from my model can be directly compared with data 
presented by Dr. Tom Frieden, the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC). (http://ireta.org/2015/04/07/high-risk-opioid-use/) 
 
 
Figure 5: Infographic from Dr. Tom Frieden of the CDC 
 
Even though Director Frieden’s model is a static “snapshot” and my model is 
dynamic -- from a comparison between the numerical result of my model calculation (one 
death per 133 heavy users) and the data from figure 5 (115 who abuse/are dependent per 
death) -- it seems reasonable to conclude that the “heavy users” in my model can 
reasonably be equated those “who abuse/are dependent” in Director Frieden’s model. 
 
There are two obvious shortcomings in my model of addiction to this point. I have 
considered only illicit drug use, and I have used the rates from the cocaine model. I will 
later remedy the first defect below by modeling the rate of opioid initiation from the 
published prescription rates, but before doing that I will consider the question of whether 
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it is possible to find published research that determines appropriate rates directly from the 
opioid data themselves.  
In their paper “Epidemiological evidence on extra-medical use of prescription 
pain relievers: transitions from newly incident use to dependence among 12–21 year olds 
in the United States using meta-analysis, 2002–13”, Parker & Anthony write,  
 
In this report, by joining previously published age-specific 
estimates for prevalence of EMPPR [Extra-medical pain 
prescription reliever] use with this study’s newly published 
age-specific estimates of incidence rates through 2013, it 
has been possible to discover that for the most part the 
mean duration of extra-medical PPR [pain prescription 
reliever] use is on the order of 2–4 year…   
 
The rate coefficient from the cocaine model for light users quitting, and therefore 
also the rate in my opioid model, is 0.28/year, implying a duration of use of the inverse of 
this number, that is 1/0.28 = 3.6 years, in good agreement with Parker & Anthony. 
 
Parker & Anthony also report,  
Previously published estimates suggest that many 
EMPPR users try these compounds no more than a 
few times and then stop, with duration far shorter 
than the estimated mean, whereas others become 
persistent users, with duration considerably longer 
than the estimated mean (e.g., those who become 
opioid dependence cases).  
 
In other words, a few light opioid users escalate to become heavy users. The 
escalation rate I used, 0.04/year, is again consistent with the range given by Parker & 
Anthony. 
 
I therefore conclude that it is justified to continue to include my simple model of 
addiction as a component of my larger system model. My search of the literature failed to 
find any description of potential similarities between the dynamics of the present opioid 
epidemic and those of the cocaine epidemic of the 1980’s and 90’s. Therefore, as far as I 
can determine, my comparison of these two epidemics (cocaine and opioid) represents a 
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novel contribution. Furthermore, my model result regarding exposure to opioids is 
consistent with my primary assumption: that any exposure to opioids carries an 
inherent risk of addiction. 
 
Step 2 implements my assumptions number 2 and 3: When the number of pills 
prescribed exceeds patient needs, exposure of family and friends leads to non-medical 
use. Initially the excess of pills is greater than any demand for this diversion of supply. 
Recreational users supplied by family and friends give pills to their peers. Initially the 
excess of pills is greater than any demand for this diversion of supply. 
 
That the number of pills available within the population exceeds the needs of 
those to whom they were prescribed is vividly demonstrated by the astonishing 
amount of drugs turned in at so-called “take-back” events (figure 6). These opioids 
are dispensed in units of tens of milligrams per dose, and returned in units of 
thousands of pounds left over. 
 
Figure 6: Drugs collected at a Tennessee “take back” event 
https://tn.gov/assets/entities/behavioral-health/sa/attachments/Prescription_For_Success_Full_Report.pdf 
 
My model for this wild excess of pills in the population is shown in the upper 
half of the diagram in figure 7 -- while the lower half of the diagram attaches to the 
addiction module developed in step 1. 
 
 




Figure 7: Model #3: Supply of pills is abundant, friends and family are supplied 
 
From the prescription rate, I determine new initiates to opioid use as a 
fraction of the number of prescriptions written (assuming the rise in prescription 
rate is largely a consequence of new patients, consistent with this being an epidemic 
situation). The fraction of those new opioid patients who do not require all of their 
pills (do not have long term pain) are held responsible in the model for exposure of 
family and friends to the excess pills (in medicine cabinets, for example).  
 
The product of three variables within this model -- “mean fraction of new 
patients per prescription”, (1 – “fraction of patients with long-term pain”), and “rate of 
use per home with extra pills per year” -- determines the normalization of the output 
parameter “opioid deaths per 100,000”, and the three parameters can be adjusted 
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until a good fit is obtained to the published data. Figure 8 shows the result from a 
typical run.  
 
 
Figure 8: Input to and output from a typical run of model #3 
 
Although it was a useful step in developing my thinking, this model is of very 
limited use both because it is seriously incomplete and because it only captures one 
of the possibilities regarding where the prescriptions go; therefore I will not 
consider it further, but will proceed directly to the inclusion of the rest of my six 
assumptions into a completed model. 
 
One parameter I used in this model #4, enclosed here in parentheses (1 -
fraction of patients with long-term pain), might seem a clumsy choice (why not 
“fraction of patients with no long-term pain”?), yet it was chosen this way in this 
model characterization of drug diversion to friends and family for a very specific 
reason. Patients with long-term pain generally will not have pills to share. It is well 
documented that opioid addiction progresses in the case of long-term use by way of 
ever-increasing doses as tolerance to the drug grows: below (section 4.5) I will 
describe a survey of deaths in Utah in which decedents routinely sought more drugs 
than their first doctor provided.  Which brings me to the next step in building a 
model of the opioid epidemic system. 
 
Step 3 implements my assumptions number 4, 5 and 6: As tolerance to the 
drug grows in an individual dependent user, doctor shopping arises in order to meet 
increasing individual need. For long-term pain sufferers who develop dependency, 
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their supply from a single doctor becomes insufficient to meet their needs. Patients 
with expectations that this need should be fulfilled within the medical system voice 
complaints about under-treatment while the world nevertheless sees an ongoing 
epidemic. The purity and reputable source of pharmaceutical opioids makes them 
preferable to heroin when they are free and readily available. When cost and scarcity 
become factors, use of heroin (which is cheaper but riskier) rises. 
 
At this point I include all six assumptions of my model, as shown in figure 9. 
Now the distinction implied by the parameter “fraction of patients with long-term 
pain” becomes fully explicated. Parallel to the “oversupply” stock and flow that I 
introduced in the previous model above, I now add a “potential undersupply” stock 
and flow for the patients with long term pain, whose growing habituation and long-
term need for pain relief are the perennial driver toward higher doses, and 
therefore potential undersupply and collateral risk of death. Taken together, the 
oversupply and undersupply channels consume all the pills: there is simultaneously 
a glut and a shortage. 
 
 
Figure 9: Model #4 of the epidemic system based on my six underlying assumptions 
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In an important refinement from the model of figure 7, I found it was preferable to 
enter the data on prescription rate by using the year-over-year increase rather than the rate 
itself; this led to a more straightforward formulation of the parameter called “initiation” -
-that is, to the part of the model that describes transition from light to heavy drug use – 
which was easier to compare with published data for the purpose of calibration.  
 
The rest of the assumptions made in building this version of my model are 
straightforward. Long-term pain patients naturally complain about the pain when they are 
under-supplied relative to their growing tolerance and increasing need. They seek more 
prescriptions from other doctors, becoming “doctor shoppers”. Also joining the ranks of 
doctor shoppers are those heavy users whose habit was initiated through exposure to 
opioids by family and friends.  
 
A nice point of modeling arises here, in that a person who has never seen a doctor, 
yet who joins the ranks of heavy users using illicit opioids, might well now be driven by 
addiction to seek a doctor’s prescription, and will almost certainly receive one -- given no 
prior record within the system and presenting as being in pain. I call such a person a 
doctor shopper, as logic demands; but the algorithms of a PDMP will not detect such an 
individual, and indeed will only discover the most egregious examples. The model 
suggests that the number of “one doctor shoppers” may in fact be large, a situation 
perhaps to be expected in the midst of an epidemic of addiction in a medical system that 
denies the prevalence of addiction. 
 
The parameter called “likelihood doctor will prescribe to a shopper” allows me to 
model the number of doctor shoppers, and will later serve as a point of inclusion for 
PDMPs because, in the case of an ideal PDMP (of which none presently exist), this 
parameter would take the value zero. Addiction then drives thwarted would-be doctor 
shoppers to go in search of heroin. Some (perhaps many) heavy users will not even 
attempt doctor shopping -- but will go directly towards heroin, driven to do so by 
considerations of cost. 
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4.5 Calibrating the Model with Real World Data: Tennessee suffers the misfortune of 
having one of the most severe cases of over-prescription of opioids in the nation, and so it 
has been closely studied. In order to calibrate a baseline model against which to compare 
the differences between states I will therefore use data from the state of Tennessee. One 
especially useful set of data comes from a five-year-long, complete, statewide sample in 
which Baumblatt et al (2014) conducted a matched case-control study (matching 
deceased opioid victims with living patients from the state database) finding that   
 
From January 1, 2007, through December 31, 2011, one-
third of the population of Tennessee filled an opioid 
prescription each year, and opioid prescription rates 
increased from 108.3 to 142.5 per 100 population per year. 
Among all patients in Tennessee prescribed opioids during 
2011, 7.6% used more than 4 prescribers, 2.5% used more 
than 4 pharmacies, and 2.8% had a mean daily dosage 
greater than 100 MME’s [Morphine Milligram 
Equivalents]. Increased risk of opioid-related overdose 
death was associated with 4 or more prescribers (adjusted 
odds ratio [aOR], 6.5; 95% CI, 5.1-8.5), 4 or more 
pharmacies (aOR, 6.0; 95% CI, 4.4-8.3), and more than 
100 MMEs (aOR, 11.2; 95% CI, 8.3-15.1). Persons with 1 
or more risk factor accounted for 55% of all overdose 
deaths. 
 
The Baumblatt et al analysis did not consider the system dynamics of the epidemic. In 
fact few studies of the system dynamics exist in the literature, as I will discuss below.  
My analysis of these same data therefore addresses a unique aspect of the epidemic in 
Tennessee that has received relatively little scrutiny.  
 
 CHR ETR JMR KKR MCR MSR NDR NER SCR SER SUL UCR WTR 
2007 99.5 133.1 93.3 103.9 86.1 60.7 81.9 134.8 114.1 129.7 131.4 120.8 116.2 
2008 112.6 154.3 107.9 116.6 95.7 68.8 93.3 152.2 127.6 146.7 151.7 139.9 131.9 
2009 115.3 157.5 117.5 117 100.5 69.2 97.6 158 130.6 154.7 161.1 145.4 134.8 
2010 120.6 162.5 114.9 119.6 103.9 69.6 99.5 157 139.5 163.6 160 149.6 138.6 
2011 134 176.7 123.4 130.6 112 76 106 179.7 150.3 177.1 179.9 162.8 142 
 
              
Table 2: Tennessee Prescription Rate per 100 Population by Health Department Regions 
2007- 2011: data from Prescription Opioid Use and. Opioid-Related Overdose Death — 
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TN, 2009–2010. Jane A.G. Baumblatt, MD. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
https://www.etsu.edu/.../Baumblatt%204 
 
In Table 2 the prescription rate is tabulated by Health Department Regions, whose 




Figure 10: Tennessee Health Department Regions 
 
 
Table 2 shows that the annual rate of prescriptions is high (more than 100 
prescriptions per 100 population) and varies by almost of factor of three from highest to 
lowest. (For comparison, the average rate per state varies from a low of 53 to a high of 
143.) When I plot the Tennessee regions (figure 11), the rates are seen to be increasing in 
every district across the five-year timeline. 
 




Figure 11: Tennessee Prescription Rate by Health Department Regions 2007- 2011 
The overdose death rate for 2008-2011 is also available from the same source, as follows: 
 
 
 CHR ETR JMR KKR MCR MSR NDR NER SCR SER SUL UCR WTR 
2008 9.2 9.9 3.1 13.4 6.1 3.1 7.7 10.8 9.2 9.1 6.5 10.6 7.2 
2009 6.3 12 1 10.2 5 5.5 8.1 8.7 8.9 10.9 9.8 10.8 7.1 
2010 4.1 13.2 2 11.8 6.3 5.8 9.9 9.2 7.7 11.4 5.9 11.9 7.4 
2011 7.2 13.8 6 10.8 8.1 3.3 10 13.5 8.4 13.8 10.4 17.1 9.8 
 
Table 3: Tennessee Overdose Death Rate per 100,000 Population by Health Department 
Regions 2008-2011: data from Prescription Opioid Use and. Opioid-Related Overdose 
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In Figure 12 I binned the data from tables 2 and 3 into four bins from lowest to 
highest prescription rate (based on the 2011 rate) -- see the legend on the right. The 
reason for binning the data was to demonstrate that there is a trend towards higher death 
rates where prescription rates are higher. This tendency is present in every case I have 
examined, not only in Tennessee. 
 
Two plausible explanations for this trend in the data are (1) opioid patients in 
some regions are prescribed successively larger amounts over time in the form of 
additional prescriptions, and the larger dose kills them – consistent with Baumblatt’s 
conclusion, quoted above, that a dose of more than 100 MMEs (aOR, 11.2; 95% CI, 8.3-
15.1) is a risk factor; and/or (2) that new patients are added within the population over 
time, and since each opioid patient has a risk of dying, the death rate therefore rises. Both 
of these factors are present as parameters in my model. 
 
The reason why I chose Tennessee for the initial calibration of my model now 
comes into sharper focus, because data exist to identify not only the contributions of 
these two factors but also the third and final variable that deconstructs how the input of 
prescriptions flows into my model: that third parameter is the mean number of patients 
per prescription. 
 
 Patients Prescriptions Pharmacies Providers 
2007 1761168 6272409 1760 14828 
2008 1913416 7176542 1801 15525 
2009 1959246 7460239 1827 16316 
2010 1959923 7739698 1885 17054 
2011 2024551 8449105 1919 17555 
 
Table 4: the total numbers of unique patients, unique prescriptions, unique pharmacies, 
and unique providers for each year from 2007 through 2011 from the Tennessee 
Controlled Substances Monitoring Program (TNCSMP); data from Prescription Opioid 
Use and. Opioid-Related Overdose Death — TN, 2009–2010. Jane A.G. Baumblatt, MD. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. https://www.etsu.edu/.../Baumblatt%204 
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From Table 4, it is straightforward to calculate the following values for my model 
of Tennessee: 
Mean number of patients per prescription  4.0 
Annual rate of increase of patients    3.3% 
Annual rate of increase of prescriptions   6.4% 
Annual rate of increase of pharmacies dispensing  2.1% 
Annual rate of increase of providers    3.9% 
Table 5: Input parameters for Tennessee model, calculated from TNCSMP data  
 
From Table 5 it is also straightforward to calculate the change in number of 
patients and the change in number of prescriptions over time. The ratio of these two 
quantities is found to differ by a factor of two from the quantity mean number of patients 
per prescription, a result that is simply interpreted to mean that half of the growth in 
prescriptions written between 2007 and 2011 is due to more patients in the population, 
and the other half to more opioids per patient. 
 
I will assume these numbers calculated from the Tennessee data for my baseline 
model, and now proceed to find data to calibrate the remaining parameters of my model 
for the entire opioid system.  
 
Modeling the factors underlying the death rate. The astonishing glut of 
prescriptions distributed nationally leads to a lot of deaths, and because a lot of people die 
from opioid overdose, I expected to find a lot of survey data about the circumstances of 
those people who died: were they taking the drug as prescribed by their doctor, or did 
they obtain the drug illegally? In fact, I found only two rigorous surveys, details of which 
can be summarized as follows: 
 
In West Virginia only 44.4% of the 295 who died had been prescribed the 
drugs that killed them, while in Utah 87.4% of the 254 deceased had been 
prescribed prescription pain medication in the year before they died, almost all 
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(91.8%) from a healthcare source. Yet in both cases strong evidence of drug 
misuse, diversion, and doctor shopping were also present. 
 
The large difference between these two surveys – that in one state the majority of 
deaths were from drug abuse, while in the other state most resulted quite directly from 
doctors’ prescriptions – indicates the presence of that large state-to-state variation in 
prescription drug abuse that I anticipated in choosing my research topic. Less formal 
information, in the form of innumerable anecdotal accounts no less heart-rending for their 
lack of rigor, confirms this same trend across the nation. Some people come to opioids 
through prescriptions from their doctor, while others get them elsewhere – frequently 
from friends and family. This fact is clearly established through surveys of the living 
regarding their drug use: 
 
 




- 48 - 
 
  The Utah survey is important because almost all of the subjects (87.4%) fall into 
the “doctor-initiated” category, and yet widespread signs of addiction are clearly seen. 
This is a survey of close relatives of the people who died, giving an intimate glimpse into 
the realities of the opioid epidemic -- a complete and unbiased survey that finds 75% of 
those close relatives had expressed concern about medication use even though the 
deceased got their drugs as prescriptions from their doctors. They were right to be 
concerned, because 52.9% had taken pills more often than their prescription specified; 
31.6% had obtained prescriptions from more than one doctor during the previous year; 
and 29.8% had used for reasons other than treating pain, almost half of which “to get 
high”.  
 
In contrast, the West Virginia survey had a minority of doctor-initiated users 
(44.4%). This sample had pharmaceutical diversion in 63.1% of the deaths, and doctor 
shopping in 21.4%. The rate of doctor shopping was therefore less in the West Virginia 
sample than in the Utah sample. That is, those who got their first opioids from doctors 
continued to get their drugs from doctors as their appetite for the drugs grew, in line with 
the fact that people think drugs they get from their doctors are safe. 
 
The fraction of drug diverters in the West Virginia survey of deaths was so large 
that it was possible to investigate the age distribution within the sample. Drug diversion 
was greatest among those aged 18 -24 and decreased across each successive age 
group. This age distribution for diversion, skewed as it is to younger users in West 
Virginia, is significantly different from the national average (figure 14), again 
demonstrating significant variations from state to state. 
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Figure 14: National average of opioid overdose death rates by age group 
http://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/overdose.html  
 
This variation in the age distribution of opioid deaths by geographic region is a 
key indicator of a crucial factor in the epidemic. The press is full of reports of young 
people abusing drugs (like those who died in West Virginia), and yet the national average 
distribution of those who die peaks in the age range of 45 – 54 years old (Figure 14). 
 
Earlier, I learned from Baumblatt et al (2014) that higher doses of opioids “more 
than 100 MMEs (aOR, 11.2; 95% CI, 8.3-15.1)” are a risk factor for death. I struggled to 
find data on dosage levels until I found the information I needed outside of the peer-
reviewed literature in a report called “A Nation in Pain” written by Express Scripts 
Holding Company, a pharmacy claims processing business. In fact Express Scripts is the 
largest pharmacy benefit management (PBM) organization in the United States, with 
2013 revenues of $104.62 billion, and so the sample size for these data, while not 
explicitly stated, is probably very large. Figure 15 shows the age distribution of patients 
receiving 120 mg or more opioid more than 50% of the time.  
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Figure 15: Patients receiving 120 mg or more opioid more than 50% of the time 
 
A Nation in Pain also reports that  
 
The quantity of opioids contained in each prescription increased 
for both women and men over the study period, rising 6.5% in five 
years. 
 
Taken together, the data in this section hint at an alarming dichotomy that 
deserves much more study, namely that young people are in most jeopardy from 
diverted drugs and that older people are in most jeopardy from their prescribed 
drugs. This is perhaps not surprising based on the assumptions doctors make about 
doctor shoppers and drug seekers. Many doctors assume they know what doctor shoppers 
look like, which is in part why PDMP participation is low when voluntary systems are in 
place. Doctors know best, in their own minds. Yet the doctors’ frequent assumption that 
doctor shoppers are young is incorrect. Many turn out to be middle age or senior citizens, 
as the Utah survey showed. Furthermore, older people statistically are more likely to be 
prescribed multiple drugs, and the prospect of drug interaction must be factored in; 
specifically, benzodiazepines are known to be hazardous in combination with opioids.  
 
Although not a prescription drug, alcohol is also known to pose a similar hazard. 
That drug interaction is a very significant problem, has been demonstrated by a very large 
statistical analysis from the year 2010: of the 92,209 emergency room opioid overdose 
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cases reviewed by Yokell et al (2014), 23.2% had a concurrent diagnosis of acute 
benzodiazepine intoxication, and 7.6% of acute alcohol intoxication.  
 
(Footnote: This rate of alcohol intoxication is not elevated relative to national levels of 
alcoholism, and so cannot reasonably be expected to be lowered further by any policy 
intervention aimed at prescription drugs. The fact that approximately a quarter of 
emergency room case are found to be under the influence of other prescription drugs is 
very troubling, however, and offers a clear possibility for effective intervention, which 
could be a highly effective addition to the best practices of PDMPs. 
-- end of footnote) 
 
In my baseline model I will set the parameter fraction of patients who use every 
pill at the middle of its range (0.5), because the data presented above clearly indicate that 
both the “oversupply” and the “undersupply” channels of the model are populated, yet the 
values for West Virginia and Utah, for example, are clearly different. The sensitivity 
analyses below will address this question further. 
 
The number of new extra-medical users per year can be modeled using the very 
same data on first use of illicit opioids that I used earlier when first developing my model 
of addiction (Model #2 in Figure 3), this time predicting that rate of first use from the 
prescription rate. This happens in the model by drug diversion. Specifically, from the 
number of prescriptions the model calculates the number of homes with an excess of pills, 
from which the diversion of prescriptions is estimated (I set the baseline model at a value 
of 50% of the homes suffering diversion of a prescription), and finally multiply by a 
factor called proliferation of pills that accounts for the fact that prescriptions comprise a 
bottle of pills, but sharing (probably) happens by the pill. I will vary proliferation of pills 
but strictly mathematically I could equally well vary the number of homes suffering 
diversion because only the product of these two terms enters: I modeled the situation with 
this apparently redundant parameter in order to make explicit the counting of number of 
prescriptions on one hand, and the number of pills on the other.  
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When the value of the parameter proliferation of pills is set to a value of 4 the 
model number of non-medical users is similar to the data (Figure 16). The difference in 
detail between the shapes of the two curves may be an artifact of the precision of the data 
or demonstrate a limitation of this simple model. Both because the shapes of the two 
curves are somewhat different, and because I will consider not the absolute values of 
parameters like this one but rather the effect of changing them from the baseline model 
values in my sensitivity analyses below there is little motivation to make any further 
attempt at a best fit for a model like this. I will discuss the issue of goodness of fit in 
system dynamics models below. 
 
 
Figure 16: The model can approximate the number of non-medical users given the 
prescription rate as input when proliferation of pills is set to a value of 4. 
 
The model value for rate of shortfall per patient per year modulates the number 
of shortfalls and complaints which also depends on the (calculated) number of Long-term 
patients who use every pill prescribed, and so have long-term access issues. The number 
of long term pain sufferers complaining of under-treatment numbers 1.1 million (ref), and 
that value is matched by my model for rate of shortfall per patient per year = 0.15/year. 
 
I now proceed to set all of the baseline parameters to the values established in this 
section. Running the model now gives a prediction for opioid deaths per 100,000 that 
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factor of two different from that obtained from my naïve model #2; but that earlier model 
#2 was incomplete, because it did not include first use of opioids by patients with 
prescriptions. Its sole purpose having been served in allowing an early approximation to 
the modeling of addiction, model #2 will not be considered further. 
 
The number of heroin users in the country is variously estimated to be between 
60,000 and a million. When I set rate of heavy users affected by price to 0.1/year, the 
number of heavy users per year who switch to heroin because of price in the model has a 
value of 300,000 in 2010. This is comfortably within the target range, and so these 
parameters are adopted into the baseline model. 
 
The rate at which heavy users seek extra prescriptions is unknown. People who 
become habituated to illicit (diverted) prescription opioids and then go to see a doctor for 
more are almost invisible to the present medical system. If such a person tells a doctor 
that his or her back hurts, having no prior prescriptions, that person will probably get 
opioids. For the baseline model I set the rate at which heavy users seek extra 
prescriptions = 0.5/year. These people are doctor shoppers, and yet are not countable by 
any PDMP algorithm. They do make a contribution to my model, however, and so their 
contribution will contribute fully in my sensitivity analyses below. This is a good 
example of the kind of effect that might be elucidated from a system dynamics model, but 
not from a more static statistical analysis. 
Baseline model parameter             Value 
  
fraction of prescriptions that represent dose increase  0.5 
mean number of patients per prescription 0.25 
fraction of patients who use every pill 0.5 
proliferation of pills 4 
rate of shortfall per patient per year 0.15 
rate of use per home with extra pills per year 0.5 
rate at which heavy users seek extra prescriptions 0.5 
rate of heavy users affected by price 0.1 
likelihood doctor will prescribe to shopper 0.5 
 
Table 6: Parameter values for the baseline model 
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The final parameter requiring calibration in my model is likelihood doctor will 
prescribe to shopper. This parameter changes downwards by design when PDMPs are 
introduced, and declines further when PDMPs become mandatory. I will adopt a mid-
range value of 0.5 for the baseline model, in order to accommodate extreme variations in 
either direction from this mid-point. In particular, pill mills and ideal PDMP regulation 
lie at opposite ends of this range. 
 
A first test of the performance of baseline model can be conducted by using the 
data from Tennessee for the various Health Department Regions. Earlier, in order to 
demonstrate the correlation between prescription rates and death rates region by region, I 
was obliged to bin the data, because the death rate data are based on relative small 
numbers (in the sense of statistics, not humanity) and so are noisy. The prescription rates, 
however, are based on much bigger numbers, and are not nearly so noisy. Therefore I can 
usefully run the time series prescription rate data (Table 1) through my model to predict 
death rates region by region. (Because I use year over year increase as the input, I first 
extrapolated the data back to the beginning of the epidemic using the shape of the 
national prescription rate trend as a template.) The actual death rates (binned, as before) 
are plotted in the left frame of Fig 17, and the model death rates (less noisy because 
predicted by the model from prescription rates) are plotted in the right frame. One 
parameter, rate of death of heavy user, was varied to create this fit, and it was necessary 
to double the value relative to the baseline model. Higher doses are a risk factor, and per 
capita consumption is high in TN; of course, other explanations are possible, as I will 
explore further below. 
 
Fig 17: death rates, data as a function of prescription rates (left); model death rates (right) 
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5. Findings  
5.1 Learning about System Dynamics Models: I decided to investigate a System 
Dynamics model for this study (1) because there is evidence for time delays between 
cause and effect in the opioid epidemic, (2) because of the accumulation of stocks and 
flows within the system of opioid distribution, and (3) because I had read that System 
Dynamics models are considered an effective tool in the study of epidemics. As described 
in section 4.2, the data show that it is accurate to describe the opioid crisis as an epidemic 
because opioid abuse is seen springing up in isolated pockets, increasing over time, and 
spreading into adjacent geographic regions exactly like a contagious disease.  
I therefore identified a software package to meet my modeling needs. The 
software I chose to use, Vensim, comes with many useful learning examples 
(https://www.researchgate.net/figure/277158047_fig1_Figure-1-Stock-flow-diagram-for-
a-simple-epidemic-model) including models of epidemics such as Figure 18.  
 
Figure 18:  A Stock-flow diagram for a simple epidemic model 
As I learned to use the software by studying examples like this, I asked myself 
which of the many variables and interconnections that were raised by my literature search 
could form the basis for my model of the opioid epidemic. I wondered how I would know 
that I had chosen “correctly”. I tried to use Figure 18 as an inspiration for my own work. I 
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loops. As I worked to develop such a feedback-dominated model, the first effort I 
produced was the model shown in Figure 19. It provided me with a major surprise. 
 
Figure 19: An unsuccessful System Dynamic model of the opioid epidemic 
The concept underlying figure 19 is that the doctors and their patients infect each 
other with the idea of opioids as a panacea for pain relief, and that the spread of this 
infectious idea leads to the writing of the many opioid prescriptions that fuel the 
epidemic. Comparison of figure 19 with my final model presented earlier (chapter 4, 
figure 9) shows that the two are very different in detail, because they are based on very 
different philosophies. Yet they contain many of the same individual elements.  
 
The model in figure 19 turns out to have a fundamental problem. Through 
repeated attempts, I discovered that it is not possible to fit the data with this kind of 
model including any of its variants that I constructed. I was astonished by this failure. To 
be candid I had thought it was inevitable that any sufficiently complicated diagram would 
yield a fit. Or equivalently, I might say that I underestimated system dynamics. I thought 
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perhaps it was little more that a clever didactic tool to illustrate relationships within an 
interconnected system. I spent a lot of time trying to adjust the interconnections and 
relationships of figure 19 to fit my data, until repeated failure and further reading led me 
to a very different perspective. The paper crucial to my improved understanding of the 
issues was “Optimisation of System Dynamic Models” (Dangerfield 2009), which 
specifically addresses the example of the model in figure 18. Dangerfield writes 
 
A separate improvement to the model may be sought where 
it is required to fit the model to past time series data. 
Optimisation here involves minimising a statistical function 
which expresses how well the model fits a time-series of 
data pertaining to an important model variable. In other 
words a vector of parameters are explored with a view to 
determining the particular parameter combination which 
offers the best fit between the chosen important model 
variable and a past time series dataset of this variable. This 
type of optimisation might be generically termed model 
calibration. 
 
Dangerfield’s identification of the fundamental role of calibration proved to be 
key to my building a successful model. I shifted my focus to follow the trajectory of the 
drugs themselves, using the rate of prescriptions written as the time-series of data from 
which the rest of my model should flow. From the perspective offered by Dangerfield, it 
became clear that the ability to calibrate my baseline model (chapter 4) is an important 
validation of the model’s appropriateness and usefulness. Specifically, my baseline model 
fits the national averages for prescription rate of opioids and death rates due to opioid 
poisoning.  This simple model includes over-prescription by doctors, recreational drug 
use, drug diversion, doctor shopping, under treatment of pain, escalation to the use of 
heroin, addiction, dependency, and death. In the language of Dangerfield, my baseline 
model is “the particular parameter combination which offers the best fit” to the time 
series of the prescription data. 
 
When the parameters of this model are varied away from the baseline values, we 
enter the realm of “what if”, because the baseline model fits the real world data, and so 
variations shift us into a hypothetical, imaginary domain of “what might have happened”. 
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It is of course useful to consider such parameter variations, so that each of the driving 
factors in the model can be studied in detail in a series of “what if” scenarios, often called 
“sensitivity analyses”, as follows: 
 
5.2 Drug Sharing: My model directly links the number of prescriptions written to the 
number of people annually initiated into opioid abuse. It is important to realize that it was 
by no means a foregone conclusion that these two data sets could be modeled 
concordantly with the set of assumptions I made. Therefore, the concordance found in my 
model corroborates the idea that a major source of illicit drugs is diversion of legally 
prescribed opioids from family and friends. The baseline model value, determined from 
real world data, is four people per diverted prescription, an entirely plausible number, 
since drug sharing is known to be very common (Inciardi et al 2007).  
 
By varying this drug-sharing parameter the model can answer the questions, 
“What if the number of pills diverted were different? How specifically would the death 
rate change?” Because, within the model -- as prescriptions are taken from medicine 
cabinets and spread into the world – some people become initiated to opioid use, some of 
them become addicted, and some of them die. The parameter proliferation of pills models 
the issue of how many people are infected from a single prescription. What if it changed 
from its present real-world value of 4?  
Figure 20 shows the effect of varying the parameter proliferation of pills. 
 
Figure 20: The effect of varying model parameter proliferation of pills (the number of 
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There are two noteworthy facts about Figure 18. Firstly, the size of the effect is 
large – a tremendous number of lives would be saved if pill sharing were stopped. 
Secondly, the death rate is not linearly proportional to the parameter proliferation of pills. 
Because system dynamics models are non-linear, it would be simplistic to think that the 
changes predicted by the model with regard to this or other parameters can be accurately 
anticipated by simple scaling. Specifically, in this case, the predicted death rate would 
have decreased by almost a factor of two in the year 2010 if proliferation had been 
reduced by a factor of 4. This non-linearity follows from the fact that proliferation of pills 
is not the only channel through which victims get their drugs. Sad to say, every patient 
who ever receives an opioid prescription from a doctor is also another potential addict.  
 
5.3 Long Term Pain: In my model a significant fraction of patients do not share their 
pills. This is the population that includes long term pain sufferers whose tolerance grows 
over time, and who therefore tend to consume all the drugs they can obtain. What if 
doctors only prescribed for this population? What change in the death rate would result? 
Qualitatively, it is obvious that the number of pills available to be diverted would be 
smaller, and so the death rate would go down. Quantitatively, Figure 21 shows the model 
results for four values of the parameter fraction of patients who use every pill. 
 
 
Figure 21: The effect of varying model parameter fraction of patients who use every pill 
(called “fraction” in the figure). 
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prescription patterns were such that the patient for whom the drugs were intended 
consumed all of the drugs provided. That is, drug diversion is a major cause of death. 
 
5.4 Transition to Use of Heroin: In a recent article in The New Yorker, Agent James J. 
Hunt, the head of the New York Division of the Drug Enforcement Agency, gave his 
opinion about heroin in Staten Island, NY: 
Agent Hunt’s office chair at his big desk in D.E.A. 
headquarters in Manhattan is black and high-backed. He 
wore a black shirt and a muted tie. His blue eyes and his 
blond, wavy hair parted almost in the middle made his face 
stand out as if in an Old Master dark-background oil 
portrait. I asked if the plan to push large quantities of 
cheap heroin and undersell the illegal pill market had been 
the idea of a particular person—like El Chapo Guzmán 
(the Sinaloan cartel leader who went to jail, escaped, and 
was recently recaptured). Hunt thought a minute and said, 
“Yes, it probably was his idea, or the idea of four or five 





When heroin is cheaper than prescription opioids, some heavy users will switch to 
heroin. Because the precise relationship between rate and price is unknown (no data are 
available on this issue), I can offer only an order of magnitude estimate. My model 
indicates that cheaper product could create hundreds of thousands of heroin users 
nationally. 
 
Nor is price the only driver away from prescription drugs and towards heroin. 
From the same New Yorker article quoted above: 
Within a few months, evidence seemed to show that ISTOP 
had reduced the amount of illegal opioids on the market. 
Critics said the law would create a greater demand for 
heroin, and that seemed to have occurred. According to 
N.Y.P.D. Captain Dominick D’Orazio, commanding officer 
of Staten Island Narcotics, seizures of pills had gone down 
forty-four per cent, while seizures of heroin had gone up by 
the same amount. 
 
A similar trend is seen in King County, Washington (Figure 22). 
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Figure 22: from http://adai.washington.edu/pubs/cewg/Drug%20Trends_2014_final.pdf 
 
 
5.5 Doctor Shopping: A primary motivation for the creation of PDMPs is to abridge the 
practice of doctor shopping. In my model the parameter L, the likelihood doctor will 
prescribe to shopper, captures this desired change with an assigned value between 0 and 
1. Figure 23 shows the number of doctor shoppers given by the model for three cases of 
L: reducing the probability of a prescription from 70% to 30% in the year 2011 would 
have reduced the number of doctor shoppers by a million.   
  
Figure 23: The effect of varying model parameter likelihood doctor will prescribe to 
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Since about 200 million opioid prescriptions were written in 2011, and doctor 
shopping is believed to be rampant, it should be expected that the size of the reduction 
would be of the order of millions. But PDMPs generally define doctor shoppers as 
individuals seeking more that some specified number of prescriptions (typically five). 
The PDMP algorithm makers use that kind of definition because they have no choice: 
their algorithms can only control the things they can count. System dynamics 
modelers are, however, not constrained by such artificial limitations. 
 
In my model, therefore, people addicted to opioids obtained by illegal means and 
subsequently seeking a legal prescription to satisfy their habit are classified as doctor 
shoppers (as are people who simply heard about these drugs on the news and want to try 
them; for, in the same way that warning labels have unintended consequences, news 
reports outlining the dangers and potency of these drugs will have varied results). 
Consequently I expect that the reduction in doctor shopping activity reported by a PDMP 
will necessarily be very much smaller than predicted by my model, but the trends in the 
data should be similar to the model prediction.  
 
Data are just beginning to become available. Figure 24 is from Tennessee, while 
Figure 25 shows trends from ten other states, comparing and contrasting those states that 
have mandated PDMPs with those that so far have not. Clearly, prescribers do not use 
PDMPs until and unless they become mandatory, as Figures 25 and 26 so vividly 
illustrate.  
 
Figure 24 http://www.slideshare.net/OPUNITE/pdmp-5-hopkins-dreyzehneroleary 
 









Figure 26: http://www.slideshare.net/OPUNITE/pdmp-5-hopkins-dreyzehneroleary 
 
5.6 Future Course of the Epidemic: My model is able to predict the future course of the 
epidemic by assuming the future rate of new prescriptions and any assumed changes in 
the various parameters of the baseline model as a result of assumed policy changes. 
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For example, I consider the extreme and unrealistic assumption that no doctor 
writes an opioid prescription for a new opioid patient after 2011, and that no heavy user 
switches to heroin. This counter-factual case is considered as a limiting condition -- to 
show that the pool of heavy users persists for a long time under any assumption in my 
model, as shown in Figure 27. Therefore my model shows that the effects of the epidemic 
would linger even under the most optimistic assumptions, both because opioids are 
addictive and because long-term pain sufferers have ongoing need. 
 
 
Figure 27: The most optimistic extrapolation of the epidemic  
 
If I add the assumption that 30% of these heavy users switch to heroin, then the 
number of new heroin users exceeds a million before the end of the decade. Consistent 
with the assumption of tighter prescription practices, the number of long-term pain 
patients experiencing under-treatment of their pain also grows rapidly. Mandatory PDMP 
implementation is no more successful, but necessarily produces similar outcomes, 
because its intent is to curtail the number of opioid initiates, but cannot logically do so to 
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6. Discussions  
 
6.1 The Rationale for PDMPs: I described in Section 2.1 how physicians in the 
nineteenth century, faced with a lethal combination of ignorance and limited alternatives, 
were seduced by the short-term symptomatic relief delivered by morphine, and often 
addicted their patients to opioids. The tragic lessons of that time led to stricter 
prescription laws, and taught twentieth-century physicians to be extremely cautious in 
using opioids. Warnings about the dangers through popular and professional publications 
were widespread and, because opioids were understood to be extremely addictive, they 
became a solution of last resort.  
 
Yet at the end of the twentieth century the use of prescription opioids suddenly 
and dramatically increased. The number of opioid prescriptions written, and the rate of 
deaths by opioid poisoning, grew by large factors year over year, as shown in Figure 28. 
 
 
Figure 28: Increase in the rate of prescriptions and the rate of opioid deaths  
 
The lessons of the nineteenth century had been forgotten. A change in attitude of 
the nation’s doctors – a change without which there would be no opioid epidemic -- had 
been driven by two very strong and very different factors. The first driver was the desire 
to eliminate pain completely, and the second was aggressive marketing by drug 
manufacturers (Section 4.2). The nation was awash in prescription drugs, and the 
government was obliged to take remedial action through the introduction of new policies 
(Section 2.2). 
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Because information technology (specifically proliferation of access to the 
Internet) was growing so very rapidly during the onset of the opioid epidemic it was 
natural that the idea of PDMPs would arise, in the words of the New York Attorney 
General,  
…to increase detection of prescription fraud and drug 
diversion [and] establish an on-line, real-time, controlled 
substance reporting system that requires prescribers and 
pharmacists to search for and report certain data at the 
time a controlled substance prescription is issued, and at 
the time such substance is dispensed (Section 2.3). 
 
The next four sections, 6.2 through 6.5, discuss the four research questions 
identified for detailed consideration in chapter 3. In each case the question is stated as the 
header of the section. 
 
6. 2 Are Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs an effective tool in curbing opioid 
abuse? In answer to this first research question I find that the decrease in prescription 
opioid abuse caused by PDMPs is often offset by a collateral increase in the use of heroin 
(Section 5.3). Furthermore, the focus of PDMPs on doctor shopping does little to curb 
abuse for two fundamental reasons. Firstly, a majority of opioid abusers have their first 
experiences through recreational drug use (Section 5.1) using products supplied free by 
friends and family, because doctors routinely write prescriptions only a fraction of which 
is consumed by the patient. My model calculations show that such a prescription, not 
completely consumed by the patient, will typically be distributed among four friends and 
family. PDMPs are not able to track this activity, and yet the casual user may go on to 
become habituated or addicted. Secondly, such a now-habituated user, presenting as a 
first-time “pain” patient to a doctor, is indistinguishable from a legitimate patient in pain, 
and so will not trigger the PDMP system either (Section 5.4). 
 
6.3 How does the mandatory use of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs affect 
the supply of opioids to long-term pain sufferers, many of whom already contend 
that their pain is under-treated? In answer to this second research question I find that 
long-term patients, who are known to develop tolerance over time, may (because of the 
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regulation of opioids through PDMPs) have the experience that they are insufficiently 
supplied, and therefore still in pain. I find that the mandatory use of PDMPs does limit 
the access of long-term pain patients, who are caught in an unfortunate bind as their 
already-large appetite for opioids grows through habituation. They therefore become the 
individuals most likely to attract negative attention from PDMPs. Yet such long-term 
users lobby effectively for relief. Organizations like the APS and the VHA (Section 4.2), 
drive doctors towards the writing of more prescriptions. A year long comprehensive 
survey of all opioid deaths in Utah (Section 4.6) is pivotal in demonstrating the outcome 
of prescription to pain sufferers. This survey finds that 75% of close relatives of the 254 
decedents had expressed concern about medication use even though the deceased got 
their drugs as prescriptions from their doctors; that 52.9% had taken pills more often than 
their prescription specified; and that 31.6% had obtained prescriptions from more than 
one doctor during the previous year.  
 
6.4 How large a factor in the opioid epidemic is sharing of drugs with family and 
friends? In answer to this third research question I find that drug diversion is a major 
contributor to the opioid death rate. Initial access to opioids for many people is from 
family or friends. Aggressive lobbying has created a culture in which opioids are 
represented as no more hazardous than over-the-counter painkillers, and so many people 
accept a “gift” of opioids without reservation, and use them either for pain relief or 
recreation. For a significant fraction of such casual users, whose number the 
pharmaceutical industry has caused to be huge, this is the first step to addiction. 
 
6.5 Does a System Dynamics analysis provide an adequate description for the onset 
of the opioid epidemic? In answer to this fourth research question I find that a System 
Dynamics model fits the parameters of the opioid epidemic. The fact that the model 
provides a satisfactory fit is consistent with the possibility that these six assumptions I 
made in building my model are valid: (1) A population exposed to opioids exhibits 
dependency and death at an empirically determinable rate. The original reason for 
exposure to opioids is not a factor. (2) When the number of pills prescribed exceeds 
patient needs, exposure of family and friends leads to non-medical use. (3) Initially the 
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excess of pills is greater than any demand for this diversion of supply. (4) Recreational 
users supplied by family and friends give pills to their peers. (5) Initially the excess of 
pills is greater than any demand for this diversion of supply. (6) As tolerance to the drug 
grows in an individual dependent user, doctor shopping arises in order to meet increasing 
individual need. For long-term pain sufferers who develop dependency, their supply from 
a single doctor becomes insufficient to meet their needs. Patients with expectations that 
this need should be fulfilled within the medical system voice complaints about under-
treatment while the world nevertheless sees an ongoing epidemic. The purity and 
reputable source of pharmaceutical opioids makes them preferable to heroin when they 
are free and readily available. When cost and scarcity become factors, use of heroin 
(which is cheaper but riskier) rises. 
 
Variation of the various parameters within the model provides a sensitivity 
analysis that highlights the huge importance of sharing of pills with family and friends as 
a driver of the opioid epidemic (Section 5.1). The death rate might plausibly be halved by 
a major reduction in pill sharing, but the model also shows that the effects of the 
epidemic would linger even under the most optimistic assumptions, both because opioids 
are addictive and because long-term pain sufferers have ongoing need (Section 5.5). 
 
6.6 The Tradeoff Between Access and Addiction:  
Opioids can relieve terrible suffering. Well-informed patients in pain, aware of 
the argument of “pain as the 5th vital sign” (section 2.6), visit their doctors in full 
expectation of relief. They are naturally unwilling to take no for an answer. Indeed they 
are incredulous whenever they are denied their drug. But opioids are also dangerously 
addictive. Therefore there is an inherent and unavoidable tension between the potential of 
opioids, both to do great good through pain relief and to do great harm through the 
scourge of addiction. 
 
In the literature search (chapter 2) I discovered an unsurprising consensus that 
access to healthcare generally, and to dentists and 
pharmacists in particular, increases the availability of 
prescription opioids in communities, which, in turn, is 
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associated with higher rates of opioid abuse” (Wright et al 
2014). 
 
The GAO hearing discussed in sections 2.6 and 4.2 recognized that tradeoff in its 
title: “TO DECREASE ABUSE AND MISUSE … WHILE ASSURING 
AVAILABILITY FOR PATIENTS”. This difficult and perhaps irreconcilable dilemma is 
implicit in the task facing pain doctors. It is therefore naturally repugnant to prosecutors 
and public alike when pill mills are set up to prey upon people in pain.  
 
 The problem is further compounded by the recreational use of opioids, recorded 
in history since the time of the Sumerians (section 2.1). The initial use of “the joy plant” 
in a search for euphoria can end in addiction. As tolerance to the drug increases, so the 
amount of drug need to achieve the same degree of effect is collaterally increased. 
 
 The best recourse to achieve a proper balance between access and addiction lies in 
a clear understanding of the risks and benefits. As this thesis has shown, we live in a time 
when the dangers of opioids have been broadly underestimated for more than a 
generation. This has been a major contributor to the present epidemic. The introduction 
of PDMPs is an attempt to regulate the balance. The counter-pressures implicit from 
addiction, and from those who supply the addicts, work to thwart the regulatory effort. 
 
6.7 Limitations of the Present Study: The modeling software I used is able to add 
almost unlimited degrees of complexity. It would therefore be possible to extend the 
present work to include more factors. Indeed there have been a few efforts to build 
system dynamics models of the opioid epidemic that include factors beyond the scope of 
my work -- most notably those by Wakeland and his collaborators -- including a paper 
published 2015 November that  
incorporates use trajectories including development of use 
disorders, transitions from reliance on informal sharing to 
paying for drugs, transition from oral administration to 
tampering to facilitate non-oral routes of administration, 
and transition to heroin use by some users, as well as 
movement into and out of the population through quitting 
and mortality. 
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I made a design decision to keep my assumptions and my model as simple as 
possible. The major advantage of this approach is that it captures the dynamics of the 
epidemic system in a way that exposes the root issues. This is consistent with the best 
traditions of the field of System Dynamics (Sterman 2000). 
 
A second and potentially more troublesome limitation of my approach is the 
possibility that the system dynamics model contains elements of self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Specifically, when I choose an element to model, for example “homes with oversupply 
available for extra-medical use”, that topic inevitably becomes a subject for discussion 
and analysis. Perhaps this is not so bad, because the model may return a value of zero for 
the contribution of a factor that turns out to be irrelevant. More concerning is the 
possibility that an important factor has been omitted from the model. For in such a case, 
there is no mechanism within the scope of my approach for that missing important factor 
to arise from the exercise of modeling. The only checks for such potentially missing 
factors lie in the completeness of my literature review and in critique of the thesis itself. 
 
6.8 Future Work: (1) Among the factors that should be considered in future work, the 
issue of drug interactions is perhaps the greatest. Benzodiazepines and alcohol are both 
known to increase the risk of mortality for opioid users, and yet doctors often prescribe 
benzodiazepines to their opioid patients (especially to older patients, for whom they are 
specifically counter indicated), and many patients drink alcohol. The statistics from 
emergency room admissions are alarming with regard to the issue of drug interactions -- 
23.2% acute benzodiazepine intoxication and 7.6% acute alcohol intoxication in a large 
sample of 92,209 admissions. 
(http://archinte.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=1918924). 
 
(2) The extremely troublesome finding (section 4.5) that young people are in most 
jeopardy from diverted drugs while older people are in most jeopardy from their 
prescribed drugs should be the subject of future study and intervention. The data I 
presented in support of this conclusion are compelling. Anecdotal reports are fully 
consistent with this finding. The mindsets and motives for opioid use in these two groups 
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are widely different. Yet separate interventions tailored to the needs of the two groups 
have yet to be identified. 
 
6.9 Latest Policy From The White House: Another measure of the plausibility of the 
ideas presented in this thesis is the extent to which they anticipate emergent national 
policy, enacted since the completion of my model calculations. In February 2016 
President Obama proposed $1.1 Billion in new funding to address prescription opioid 
abuse and the heroin use epidemic. Several of the tools and interventions identified as 
effective in the president’s proposal that are fully consistent with the themes of this thesis 
include “evidence-based prevention programs”, “prescription drug monitoring”, and 




Also reported in the president’s proposal:  
The federal government is expanding access to prescription 
drug monitoring program data throughout federal 
agencies. The Department of Defense’s (DoD) Pharmacy 
Data Transaction Service automatically screens all new 
medication orders against a patient’s computerized 
medication history and permits DoD physicians to monitor 
for concerning drug usage patterns. 
 
This expansion of the federal program aligns with my policy recommendation 
(below; section 8.3) to use PDMPs to monitor drug interactions. 
  
 




A review of the literature has shown that the forces driving the current 
prescription opioid epidemic raging across the United States include aggressive 
marketing, weak regulation, addiction, freely prescribing doctors, a glut of pills available 
for sharing, and easy access to illicit drugs including heroin. This thesis has quantitatively 
analyzed the interactions between these drivers through construction of a System 
Dynamics model, in order to determine the efficacy of policy intervention through 
Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, leading to the following conclusions: 
 
1. PDMPs will not substantially affect the supply of opioids because they will catch only 
the most egregious of doctor shoppers. Opioids are addictive, people are crafty, and pain 
is a subjective experience not determinable by any test available to the prescriber. 
Therefore, as long as the opioids continue to be over-supplied by doctors, their 
proliferation into the community will continue to spread addiction. 
 
2. Mandatory PDMP use will slow but not stop opioid proliferation, and will cause long 
term pain patients to be under-treated in larger numbers. Doctors who presently do not 
choose to use PDMPs will do so when participation is mandatory, and as a result some 
types of doctor shopping will be curtailed. Collaterally, access to drugs by legitimate 
long-term pain sufferers will become more difficult. Specifically, because it is not 
uniformly acknowledged by the medical profession that long-term opioid users have 
become addicted and habituated (and so require larger doses to obtain pain relief) those 
long-term patients will be under-treated. There are very large numbers of such patients. 
 
3. PDMPs as presently implemented are poor at addressing the problem for which they 
were originally designed. They do, however, provide a good framework for dealing with 
drug interactions in a complicated prescription system. Many patients have a legitimate 
need for three or more prescribers, who occasionally will prescribe drugs that interact 
poorly with each other. PDMPs will not stop the flow of opioids but they could be 
improved by policy to stop an individual from being prescribed, for example, dangerous 
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amounts of both opioids and benzodiazepines.  
 
4. Drug diversion is a major contributor to the opioid death rate. Initial access to opioids 
for many people is from family or friends. Aggressive lobbying has created a culture in 
which opioids are represented as no more hazardous than over-the-counter painkillers, 
and so many people accept a “gift” of opioids without reservation, and use them either for 
pain relief or recreation. For a significant fraction of such casual users, whose number the 
pharmaceutical industry has caused to be huge, this is the first step to addiction. 
 
5. Opioids are addictive and should only be prescribed in cases of extreme need. Serious 
acute pain and people with terminal diseases should likely be the only people prescribed 
these drugs. As I was writing this thesis, I was delighted to see that the CDC came to this 
very conclusion in a guideline published on 3/15/2015. 
http://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/guidelines_factsheet-a.pdf 
 
6. The rate of opioid overdose deaths will remain high. Physiological changes are caused 
by ingestion of opioids, and the behavior of addicted individuals is driven, often fatally, 
towards the satisfaction of their need. Opioids are dangerous, and a society plagued by a 
glut of pills is at risk. 
 
7. A significant number of people addicted to prescription opioids will transition to 
heroin use for reasons of price and availability. An addicted person will find a way to 
satisfy the need for drugs. If prescription opioids become less readily available, or if their 
price compares unfavorably with available alternatives, addicted people will turn to 
whatever satisfies their need. For many, that will be heroin, as rapidly rising statistics 
across the nation demonstrate so tragically. 
 
In summary, the opioid epidemic was created by the confluence of greed and good 
intention: some people wanted to get fabulously rich, and others wanted to banish all 
pain. Now the country is awash with pills and populated by unwitting addicts. This study 
helps conclude that the efforts of state governments and the FDA will be insufficient to 
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stem the flow of opioids, and that there is no simple intervention to thwart drug diversion 
and sharing of pills. The opioid epidemic will ebb like other epidemics, as much through 
self-regulation as through policy intervention. When the cultural meme that opioids 
destroy lives takes hold, replacing the current idea -- that opioids are an accessible, safe 
painkiller and intoxicant – then, and only then, the epidemic will subside. 
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8. Policy Recommendations  
 
I have identified the factors that drive the ongoing opioid epidemic (Section 6), 
and find that there are three specific policy interventions that I would recommend highly. 
 
1. Opioids should be used only as a solution of last resort.  
Nineteenth-century physicians addicted patients—and, not 
infrequently, themselves—because they had few alternatives to 
symptomatic treatment. Cures were scarce and the etiology of 
painful conditions was poorly understood. An injection of 
morphine almost magically alleviated symptoms, pleasing 
doctors and patients. Many patients continued to acquire and 
inject morphine, the sale of which was poorly controlled.  
The revolutions in bacteriology and public health, which 
reduced diarrheal and other diseases commonly treated with 
opium; the development of alternative analgesics such as 
aspirin; stricter prescription laws; and admonitions about 
morphine in the lay and professional literature stemmed the 
addiction tide. One important lesson of the first narcotic 
epidemic is that physicians were educable. Indeed, by 1919, 
narcotic overprescribing was the hallmark of older, less-
competent physicians. The younger, better-trained practitioners 
who replaced them were more circumspect about administering 
and prescribing opioids.  
 www.annualreviews.org  The Opioid Addiction Epidemic page 561  
Throughout most of the twentieth century physicians remained “circumspect 
about administering and prescribing opioids” because they understood that opioids are 
extremely addictive. Yet towards the end of the twentieth century a deliberate lobbying 
effort by opioid manufacturers led important sectors of the healthcare community to act 
as if opioids are safe, resulting in the epidemic described in this thesis.  
 
Yet parts of our society, influenced by the enormous revenue that opioids 
generate, continue to act as if there is no epidemic. I have described earlier how the role 
of education about opioids was ceded to the drug manufacturers, and how the FDA was, 
and remains, complicit in this dangerous situation. This state of affairs persists despite 
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public hearings at which extensive public testimony emphasizes that “making opioid 
training mandatory for doctors [is] important, and that it shouldn’t be controlled by 
the drug industry”. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/fda-panel-urges-mandatory-opioid-training-for-doctors-1462405146 
The headline of the quoted Wall Street Journal article, “FDA Panel Urges 
Mandatory Opioid Training For Doctors,” fails to reveal that the panel, as is typical, 
recommended no remedial changes, but rather opted for the status quo. Specifically, the 
briefing material for the FDA panel, the Joint Meeting of the Drug Safety and Risk 
Management (DSaRM) Advisory Committee and the Anesthetic and Analgesic Drug 
Products Advisory Committee (AADPAC), May 3-4, 2016, included the following 
paragraph: 
The Extended Release/Long Acting (ER/LA) Opioid Analgesic 
Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) is intended to 
reduce risks and improve safe use of ER/LA opioid analgesics 
while continuing to provide access to these medications for 
patients in pain. The central component of the ER/LA Opioid 
Analgesics REMS is an education program for prescribers (e.g., 
physicians, nurse practitioners, physician assistants). Under the 
REMS, application holders of ER/LA opioid analgesics are 
required to make education programs available to healthcare 
providers (HCPs) who are prescribers of ER/LA opioid 
analgesics. The application holders are meeting this requirement 
by providing educational grants to accredited continuing 
education (CE) providers who offer training to prescribers at no 
or nominal cost. To be considered compliant with the ER/LA 
Opioid Analgesic REMS, the CE courses are required to include 
the content and messages of a “blueprint” developed by FDA for 
this purpose. The FDA Blueprint includes general and product-
specific information about the ER/LA opioid analgesics; 
information on proper patient selection for use of these drugs; 
guidance for safely initiating therapy, modifying dosing, and 
discontinuing use of ER/LA opioid analgesics; guidance for 
monitoring patients; and information for counseling patients and 
caregivers about the safe use of these drugs. Additionally, 
prescribers are provided information for how to recognize 
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Through these kinds of activities the FDA continues to promote the present 
practices for the prescription of opioids -- by the use and dissemination of language like 
“proper patient selection”, “guidance for safely initiating therapy”, and “counseling 
patients and caregivers about the safe use of these drugs”. Although the existence of the 
opioid epidemic is increasingly fully acknowledged in some branches of government 
especially the White House, nowhere in this FDA “oversight” activity is it mentioned that 
people are dying in epidemic numbers.  
Nor is the problem limited to the behavior of the FDA. For example, The New 
York Times reported: 
A pain management specialist, Dr. Nathaniel Katz, was stunned 
in 2012 when the Food and Drug Administration rejected a 
recommendation from an expert panel that had urged mandatory 
training for doctors who prescribed powerful painkillers like 
OxyContin.That panel had concluded that the training might 
help stem the epidemic of overdose deaths involving prescription 
narcotics, or opioids. At first, Dr. Katz, who had been on the 
panel, thought that drug makers had pressured the F.D.A. to kill 
the proposal. Then an agency official told him that another 
group had fought the recommendation: the American Medical 




This entrenched behavior in the regulatory agencies and among senior doctors is 
like that seen in the nineteenth century’s epidemic; and so the latter part of the quotation 
that began this section is pertinent here: 
One important lesson of the first narcotic epidemic is that 
physicians were educable. Indeed, by 1919, narcotic 
overprescribing was the hallmark of older, less-competent 
physicians. The younger, better-trained practitioners who 
replaced them were more circumspect about administering and 
prescribing opioids.  
The lessons of history therefore suggest that an effective policy intervention will 
be to change the way our society views opioids. Future doctors, concerned by what they 
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see happening around them now, are already beginning to demand better training to 
confront the ravages of the opioid epidemic: 
Calling their curriculum deficient, students at Harvard Medical 
School are teaching themselves how to treat opioid addiction 
— joining the ranks of critics who say medical schools across 
the country aren’t doing enough to prepare doctors for a 
deadly crisis. 
This spring, students at Harvard have organized their own 
trainings on how to use new medication to treat opioid 
addiction. And they’ve launched a campaign to raise 





In March 2016, The White House asked medical schools to sign 
a pledge to require students to learn new federal guidelines for 
safe opioid prescribing before they graduate. Of the nation’s 
170-plus medical schools, 61 signed on. Harvard Med and 
others refused. “We don’t agree with the idea of taking pledges 
with what to put in our curriculum,” Dean Dr. Jeffrey Flier 
said… 
 
Another important form of education is that our elected officials become able and 
willing to talk about the epidemic, and so begin to break down the stigma associated with 
addiction. Governor Chris Christie did so to great effect during his presidential 
candidacy, saying:  
 
You don’t go to a neighborhood dinner party and say, “Hey, my 
daughter is addicted to heroin. What’s new with you? But if she 




The desired outcome of my policy recommendation that we use opioids only 
as a remedy of last resort is that it becomes widely understood that opioids are 
extremely addictive. For that to happen, it will be necessary for many people to discuss 
the crisis honestly. One place for such discussion is among family and friends, which 
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2. Eliminate proliferation of pills to friends and family. The typical prescription for 
minor injury provides too many pills. These fall into the hands of others, who then 
also run the risk of addiction. Presently it is not easy to give back unused pills. It 
should be. 
 
My model calculations have shown that proliferation of opioids to friends and 
family is a major channel for abuse and addiction, and that curtailing this proliferation 
would save large numbers of lives presently lost to the opioid epidemic. 
 
Surveys show that more that 20% of people are willing to admit that they share 
opioids they obtained by prescription (Kennedy-Hendricks et al 2016). Fifty percent of 
the respondents who were still taking opioids at the time of the survey said that they 
expect to have drugs left over at the end of their treatment, and most of them also said 
that they would keep the drugs for future use in ameliorating pain for themselves (or 
others). Almost half of the survey respondents had received no counseling on storage or 
disposal of the drugs. 
 
These results confirm that doctors prescribe too many opioids, and that people are 
unaware of their dangerous addictiveness. My first policy recommendation is to educate 
doctors about the dangers; my second is to enact policy that limits the flow of pills from 
doctors via patients to family and friends -- doctors should prescribe fewer pills, and it 
should be easy for patients to dispose of any excess. 
 
3. Use PDMPs to monitor drug interaction through the tracking of benzodiazepines 
and carisoprodol in addition to opioids. Post mortem studies show that many who 
die from opioids have used other drugs too. The rapid PDMP electronic monitoring 
put in place for opioids should be extended to provide patient advice and protection 
against drug interactions. 
 
The number of prescription drugs used by Americans increases steeply with age. 
Seniors are often prescribed five or more drugs at the same time. Under these 
circumstances the possibility of unintended drug interactions rises steeply. Post mortem 
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studies (described earlier) show that people dying from opioids often have other drugs in 
their system.  
 
A particularly dangerous and increasingly common three-part mixture is that of an 
opioid, a benzodiazepine, and carisoprodol. (Both benzodiazepine  and carisoprodol have 
muscle relaxant, sedating, and anti-anxiety properties;  carisoprodol also further 




Pill-mills frequently prescribe this combination. Doctor shoppers treated by a 
variety of doctors may be prescribed the components separately and ingest the mixture 
unwittingly. A single doctor may prescribe two or three of these drugs together in 
ignorance of their potential for interaction. Drug abusers may take the mixture 
deliberately.  
 
Protection of patients from this potentially lethal drug interaction can be achieved 
by policy. Since opioids, benzodiazepine, and carisoprodol are each prescription drugs, it 
would be straightforward to extend the PDMP system to track them (and other 
prescription drugs), and so monitor the potential for interaction in a patient. Beyond the 
saving of lives, the potential cost savings in health care costs could offset the cost of the 
program. 
 
A retrospective cohort analysis (Pergolizzi et al 2014) using claims data from a 
commercial enterprise showed that among 57,752 chronic, non-cancer pain patients 5.7% 
(3,302 people) were exposed to a potentially major drug-drug interaction that resulted in 
a $609 per month increase in health care costs for the exposed patients.  
 
The rationale for my recommendations is simple: each of these policy 
recommendations – limitation of the use of opioids to cases of last resort, reduction in the 
proliferation of prescribed pills to family and friends of the patient, and PDMP 
monitoring of potential drug interactions -- could save a very large number of lives. 
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I was very pleased to see, as I was completing this thesis, that the White House 
and the CDC issued provisions very similar to my recommendations, as follows: 
 
In connection with this Federal announcement, more than 60 medical schools are 
announcing that, beginning in fall 2016, they will require their students to take some form 
of prescriber education, in line with the newly released Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain. 
 
This CDC guideline was published March 18, 2016. It begins: 
This guideline provides recommendations for primary care 
clinicians who are prescribing opioids for chronic pain 
outside of active cancer treatment, palliative care, and end-
of-life care. The guideline addresses 1) when to initiate or 
continue opioids for chronic pain; 2) opioid selection, 
dosage, duration, follow-up, and discontinuation; and 3) 
assessing risk and addressing harms of opioid use. CDC 
developed the guideline using the Grading of 
Recommendations Assessment, Development, and 
Evaluation (GRADE) framework, and recommendations 
are made on the basis of a systematic review of the 
scientific evidence while considering benefits and harms, 
values and preferences, and resource allocation. CDC 
obtained input from experts, stakeholders, the public, peer 
reviewers, and a federally chartered advisory committee. It 
is important that patients receive appropriate pain 
treatment with careful consideration of the benefits and 
risks of treatment options. This guideline is intended to 
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improve communication between clinicians and patients 
about the risks and benefits of opioid therapy for chronic 
pain, improve the safety and effectiveness of pain 
treatment, and reduce the risks associated with long-term 
opioid therapy, including opioid use disorder, overdose, 
and death. CDC has provided a checklist for prescribing 
opioids for chronic pain 
(http://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/38025) as well as a website 
(http://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/prescribingresources.ht
ml) with additional tools to guide clinicians in 
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